


**EXPERT LOREZNO VIDINO
(Liability)**

Sudan and the Bombing of the USS Cole



Lorenzo Vidino

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Summary

The October 12th, 2000, attack on the USS Cole that killed seventeen American sailors was part of a decade-long plan conceived by Osama Bin Ladin's terrorist organization, al Qaeda, to attack U.S. interests in the Middle East. Since the end of the 1980s, Bin Ladin had worked on creating a worldwide terrorist organization whose main aim was to strike at American targets. From 1991 to 1996, Osama Bin Ladin and his organization were sheltered and supported by the Sudanese government in Sudan. During these five years, al Qaeda and the Sudanese government established a symbiotic relationship and cooperated on many fronts. At that time, al Qaeda had already made public its intent to attack US forces in the Arabian Peninsula and had kept close relations with radical Islamist militants in Yemen. For example, Yemeni militants who were subsequently involved in the planning of the attack on the USS Cole traveled to Sudan to meet with Bin Ladin.

During the five years that the Sudanese government sheltered al Qaeda, the organization flourished both financially and militarily. It developed ties with several terrorist organizations and trained operatives who carried out attacks throughout the world. The help that the Sudanese government provided was indispensable, as al Qaeda could not have achieved such goals if it had not operated in a country that not only tolerated, but actually directly and knowingly helped its activities. It should be noted that, at the time, Sudan was arguably the only country in the world willing to shelter al Qaeda and that without that support the organization would have had to scatter throughout the world and constantly hide from the security apparatuses of countless countries. The shelter provided by the Sudanese government was indispensable for al Qaeda not just to survive but also to then develop the expertise, technical knowledge and wide network of contacts that allowed it to flourish and carry out attacks like the one against the USS Cole.

The Move to Sudan

As an August 1996 U.S. State Department Fact Sheet¹ on Osama Bin Ladin states, "Bin Ladin relocated to Sudan in 1991, where he was welcomed by National Islamic Front (NIF) leader Hasan al-Turabi." According to a testimony in the Africa Embassy bombing trial, there were between 1,000 and 2,000 members of al Qaeda in Sudan by the end of 1991.² Following al Qaeda's move to the Sudan in or about 1991, Osama bin Ladin established a headquarters in the Riyadh section of Khartoum, Sudan, which was heavily populated by Saudis.³ Bin Ladin remained in Sudan until May 1996, when the Sudanese government asked him to leave and he moved back to Afghanistan.⁴ During its five years in Sudan, Bin Ladin's organization flourished.

¹ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

² USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 444-445, February 13, 2001.

³ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, *Superseding Indictment*, ¶14-h, April 16, 2001.

⁴ "Osama Bin Ladin, a Chronology of his Political Life," PBS website, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binLadin/etc/cron.html>, accessed March 5, 2011.

The Sudanese government's support for al Qaeda, documented by the State Department in the above-mentioned 1996 Fact Sheet on Bin Ladin, became even more apparent during the 2001 Embassy Bombing trial. A 2001 *Wall Street Journal* article clearly summarizes how the Embassy Bombing trial revealed the Sudanese government's relationship with al Qaeda:

The court documents also revealed that although bin Ladin has had a leading role in formulating and paying for Al-Qaeda, the organization did rely heavily on state sponsorship as well. For example, Sudanese President Omar Bashir himself authorized Al-Qaeda activities in his country and gave it special authority to avoid paying taxes or import duties. More remarkably, he exempted the organization from local law enforcement. Officials of the Iranian government helped arrange advanced weapons and explosives training for al-Qaeda personnel in Lebanon where they learned, for example, how to destroy large buildings.⁵

Jamal al-Fadl, a former Bin Ladin associate who testified during the Africa Embassy Bombing trial, made it clear that al Qaeda relocated to the Sudan largely due to the Sudanese government's offer to help the organization:

Q. Yes. You just mentioned that you attended a meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, attended by members of the National Islamic Front and Usama Bin Ladin. Can you tell us what was discussed at that meeting about what would happen in the Sudan?

A. At that meeting three guys, they came over there and they talk about if the al Qaeda members come over there we help them, and also they make agreement with the group.

MR. SCHMIDT: I am sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: The reporter will please read the answer back. (Record read)

Q. Let me ask you some specific questions. Who did you understand the three persons for the National Islamic Front to be?

A. They are members for Islamic National Front.

Q. Did you understand from anything said at the meeting whether or not they had a relationship with the intelligence service in the Sudan?

A. Not in a meeting, but later on.

⁵ Emerson, Steven and Pipes, Daniel, "Terrorism on Trial," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 31, 2001, A16.

Q. When did you learn about whatever relationship they may have had with the intelligence service?

A. When I was in Sudan.

Q. How did you learn?

A. Because we got letter from the president of the Sudan --

Q. Before you describe the letter, did you see this letter yourself?

A. Yes, I got copy for it.

Q. Would you tell us who the president of the Sudan was.

A. Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir.

Q. Can you tell us what the letter to the president of the Sudan said.

MR. SCHMIDT: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: What is the theory on which it is offered?

MR. FITZGERALD: It explains the relationship between the Sudanese government and al Qaeda as set forth in the indictment.

THE COURT: The letter is not available, right?

Q. Do you have a copy of the letter?

A. Not now.⁶

Al Qaeda's Financial Activities in Sudan

During his five years in Sudan, Osama Bin Ladin set up several businesses there. In a 1994 interview cited in the 1996 State Department Fact Sheet, Bin Ladin claimed to have surveyed business and agricultural investment opportunities in Sudan as early as 1983.⁷ In Sudan in 1990, Bin Ladin embarked on several business ventures, which began to thrive following his move to Khartoum.⁸ According to the State Department, bin Ladin also formed symbiotic business relationships with wealthy NIF members by undertaking civil infrastructure development projects on the regime's behalf.⁹ Among them are:

⁶ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, pg. 232-234, February 6, 2001.

⁷ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

⁸ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

⁹ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

- Al-Hijrah for Construction and Development, Ltd., which built the Tahaddi (challenge) road linking Khartoum with Port Sudan, as well as a modern international airport near Port Sudan.¹⁰
- Taba Investment Company Ltd, an investment company.¹¹
- Wadi al-Aqiq Company, Ltd., an import-export firm that, in conjunction with Taba Investment Company, Ltd., secured a near monopoly over Sudan's major agricultural exports of gum, corn, sunflower, and sesame products in cooperation with prominent NIF members.¹²
- Al-Themar al-Mubarak-ah Agriculture Company, Ltd., which grew to encompass large tracts of land near Khartoum and in eastern Sudan.¹³
- Khartoum Tannery, a leather company,¹⁴ which was still operating as of May 4, 2004.¹⁵
- Al Themar, a Sudanese agricultural company in which Bin Ladin had a financial interest.¹⁶
- The Blessed Fruits Company and al-Ikhlās, two companies that were involved in the production of honey, fruits and vegetables, and in which Bin Ladin also had a financial interest.¹⁷
- Al Qudurat Transportation.¹⁸

Jamal al-Fadl helped explain why Bin Ladin's companies were able to thrive in the Sudan when he testified in the Africa Embassy Bombing trial:

Q. Without telling us what was in the letter from the president of the Sudan, can you tell us the circumstances under which you received a copy of the letter from the president of the Sudan?

A. I got the letter because I go to different city in Sudan and also because when we --

Q. Stop there. Who gave it to you?

A. Abu Hassan al Sudani.

Q. Who was Abu Hassan al Sudani?

A. He has membership in al Qaeda group and also at that time he runs Taba Investments.

¹⁰ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

¹¹ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Indictment: Count 1, Overt Act 12.f., September 21, 1998.

¹² State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

¹³ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

¹⁴ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Indictment: Count 1, Overt Act 12.f., September 21, 1998

¹⁵ International Company Profile, <http://www.icpcredit.com/ReportRequest.asp?sCompanyID=233437>, and International Trade Center

<http://www.intracen.org/dbms/leather/LT>Contact.Asp?DS=HS&CG=NAB&CD=&PD=&PG=1&JD=16824>,

¹⁶ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 241-242, February 6, 2001.

¹⁷ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 900-902, February 20, 2001.

¹⁸ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 245-246, February 6, 2001.

Q. Why don't we focus on that trip for a moment. What was it that Abu Hassan al Sudani wanted you to do on this business trip for which he gave you the letter?

A. Like when we go to Port of Sudan and we bring some stuff that comes -- when we have some guys from outside Sudan to go inside Sudan, that letter, we don't have to pay tax or custom, or sometime the Customs, you don't have to open our containers.

Q. So if you were going to the Port of Sudan to receive things being shipped from outside, what did you do with the letter?

A. It's held inside the Port Sudan, the custom, and also when we go from Port Sudan to Khartoum, it's a lot of local checking for the Custom and police. Every time I show them the letter and they say okay, no problem.

Q. And who was the letter addressed to?

A. To Wadi al Aqiq.

Q. And can you tell the jury what the Wadi al Aqiq Company is?

A. Wadi al Aqiq Company, it's the first company established for the group in Sudan.

Q. When you say the first company established for the group of Sudan, which group?

A. Al Qaeda group.

Q. Why don't we talk about the companies established in the Sudan. Did you work with the al Qaeda companies in the Sudan yourself?

A. Yes.¹⁹

When examining Bin Ladin's financial activities in the Sudan, the story of Al Shamal Islamic Bank is of particular note. According to the State Department, Bin Ladin and wealthy NIF members capitalized Al Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum.²⁰

Al Shamal Islamic Bank was founded in 1983 by three individuals and entities:

- al Shamal for Investment and Development, a Sudanese company²¹

¹⁹ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, pg. 238-239, February 6, 2001.

²⁰ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

²¹ Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website, <http://web.archive.org/web/20011012232453/http://www.shamalbanc.com/Statment.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014.

- Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Chairman of the Saudi Dallah al Baraka Group LLC²².
- The Sudanese Government of Northern State,²³ then controlled by Governor Mutasim Abdul-Rahim,²⁴ Secretary General of the National Congress Party in Khartoum,²⁵ and representative of Hassan al-Turabi.²⁶

Al Shamal Islamic Bank was formed in Sudan on April 1983, and started operations on January 2, 1990, with a paid capital of \$3.9 million.²⁷ Shares for subscription were issued between 1997 and 2000.²⁸ According to State Department documents, Bin Ladin invested \$50 million in the bank.²⁹

Bin Ladin's involvement in al Shamal Islamic Bank was confirmed by a 2002 Congressional Research Service report for Congress:

In 1991, bin Ladin relocated to Sudan with the approval of Sudan National Islamic Front (NIF) leader Hasan al-Turabi. There, in concert with NIF leaders, he built a network of businesses, including an Islamic Bank (al Shamal), an import-export firm, and firms that exported agricultural products. An engineer by training, bin Ladin also used his family connections in the construction business to help Sudan build roads and airport facilities. The business in Sudan (...) enabled him to offer safe haven and employment in Sudan to al Qaeda members, promoting their involvement in radical Islamic movements in their countries of origin (especially Egypt) as well as anti-U.S. terrorism.³⁰

Al Shamal Islamic Bank Chairman and shareholder,³¹ Adil Abd el Aglil Botorgey (a.k.a. Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee), is the Chairman of al-Bir Saudi Organization, whose U.S. branch, Benevolence International Foundation (BIF),³² is a front for al Qaeda and whose assets have been frozen by the US Treasury Department.³³ Al Shamal Islamic Bank

²² Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website,

<http://web.archive.org/web/20011012232453/http://www.shamalbanc.com/Statment.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014.

²³ Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website,

<http://web.archive.org/web/20011012232453/http://www.shamalbanc.com/Statment.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014.

²⁴ Website of the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, <http://www.sudanca.com/glaance/glaance.html>, accessed January 4, 2014.

²⁵ Bol, Nhial, "Sudan-Politics: Returning Exiles Risk Trial," IPS-Inter Press Service/Global Information Network, December 5, 1996.

²⁶ Khaled, Mohamed, "Bashir-Turabi Confrontation Escalates," *Al-Ahram Weekly* online edition, December 23-29, 1999, available at <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/461/re5.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014..

²⁷ Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website,

<http://web.archive.org/web/20011012232453/http://www.shamalbanc.com/Statment.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014.

²⁸ Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website,

<http://web.archive.org/web/20011012232453/http://www.shamalbanc.com/Statment.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014.

²⁹ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

³⁰ Katzman, Kenneth, "Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002," Congressional Research Service, February 13, 2002, pg. 16.

³¹ Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website,

<http://web.archive.org/web/20011031145208/http://www.shamalbanc.com/english/ECorporate.htm>, January 4, 2014.

³² USA v. Benevolence International Foundation and Enaam M. Arnaout, NDIL 02-CR-414, *Affidavit in Support of Complaint Against Benevolence International Foundation And Enaam Arnaout* 7, April 29, 2002.

³³ Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, April 30, 2004.

General Manager, Mohammad S. Mohammad, acknowledged that Osama bin Ladin had two accounts at the bank, opened on March 30, 1992 for al-Hijrah Construction and Development Ltd,³⁴ a company that the State Department says “work[ed] directly with Sudanese military officials to transport and provision terrorists training in [Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist training camps in northern Sudan].”³⁵

A third al Shamal account was opened in 1993 in the name of Osama bin Ladin’s holding company, Wadi al Aqiq, a company registered in Saudi Arabia.³⁶ Al Shamal Bank has repeatedly been used to fund criminal and terrorist activities. Jamal al-Fadl testified during the 2001 Africa Embassy trial that Bin Ladin and at least six al Qaeda operatives held bank accounts at al Shamal Islamic Bank under their real names.

Q. While you were in the Sudan, did you handle money for Osama bin Ladin?

A. Could you repeat the question.

Q. Did you work on the finances for al Qaeda while you were in the Sudan?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you know where the bank accounts of Osama bin Ladin and al Qaeda were?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whose names they were in?

A. The bank account under Osama bin Ladin in Bank Shaml [al Shamal Islamic Bank], Khartoum.

Q. That was under Osama bin Ladin’s true name?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there accounts in other names?

A. Yes. Afad Makkee got account also.

Q. Afad Makkee, the account that he had under his name, do you know what name that is?

A. I remember Madani Sidi al Tayyib.

Q. Do you know of any other persons who had al Qaeda money in their accounts?

A. Abu Rida al Suri.

Q. Do you know his true name?

A. Nidal.

Q. Anyone else that you knew had al Qaeda money in bank accounts in their name?

A. Abu Hajer al Iraqi.

Q. Do you know his true name?

A. Mamdouh Salim.

Q. Did you have any accounts in your name?

³⁴ Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website, <http://web.archive.org/web/20011012232453/http://www.shamalbanc.com/Statment.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014.

³⁵ State Department Fact Sheet, “Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier,” August 14, 1996.

³⁶ Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website, <http://web.archive.org/web/20011012232453/http://www.shamalbanc.com/Statment.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014.

A. Shared with Abu Fadhl.

Q. So you had accounts in your name that were shared with Abu Fadhl?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall anyone else that had bank accounts in their name for al Qaeda?

A. Abdouh al Mukhlafi.³⁷

At the trial, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl testified that al Qaeda operatives received monthly checks of several hundred dollars from al Shamal Islamic Bank accounts:

Q. When you worked for Osama bin Ladin, in the Sudan, how much were you paid?

A. \$1,200 . . . per month.

Q. For how long did you work for him?

A. Almost two years.

Q. What banks did he keep his money at?

A. Bank el Shamar [Al Shamal Islamic Bank].

Q. Any other banks?

A. I think he had accounts in different banks, but I only recall Bank Shamar [al Shamal Islamic Bank].³⁸

Al-Fadl also testified that he transferred \$100,000 from al Shamal Islamic Bank to an al Qaeda representative in Jordan:

Q. How did you carry the \$100,000?

A. In my bag with my clothes.

Q. Do you recall what kind of bills the \$100,000 was in?

A. I remember they all hundred bill.

Q. Sorry?

A. They all hundred bill.

Q. They were all hundred dollar bills?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave you the money?

A. Abu Fadhl, he bring it from Shamal Bank [al Shamal Islamic Bank] and he bring it to me.

Q. Abu Fadhl brought it from the Shamal Bank [al Shamal Islamic Bank]?

A. Yes.³⁹

During the course of the Embassy Bombing trial, another Bin Ladin associate, Essam al Ridi, testified that al Qaeda used al Shamal Bank for operational purposes. He stated "\$250,000 was wired from al Shamal Islamic Bank" in 1993 via Bank of New York to a

³⁷ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, pg. 332-333, February 6, 2001.

³⁸ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, pg. 882, February 20, 2001.

³⁹ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, pg. 318-319, February 6, 2001.

Bank of America account held in Dallas, Texas -- where he used it to "buy a plane delivered to bin Ladin . . . intended to transport Stinger missiles. . . ." in 1993.⁴⁰

Al Shamal Bank is the quintessential example of how the Sudanese government cooperated with al Qaeda and provided the organization with logistical help during its five years in Sudan.

Another bank that is linked to al Qaeda is Tadamon Islamic Bank, which was formed in Sudan on November 28, 1981 with an address in Khartoum, and started operations on March 24, 1983.⁴¹ Tadamon Islamic Bank facilitated al Qaeda's financial operations. According to Jamal al-Fadl's testimony at the Embassy Bombing trial, Tadamon Islamic Bank held accounts of al Qaeda operatives:

Q. Do you recall anyone else that had bank accounts in their name for al Qaeda?

A. Abdouh al Mukhlafi.

Q. Who was this person named Abdouh al Mukhlafi?

A. He is from Yemen.

Q. What role did he play for Bin Ladin?

A. He goes with Bin Ladin when Bin Ladin travel outside or inside Sudan.

Q. What role did he play for Bin Ladin when Bin Ladin traveled?

A. He is like bodyguard for him, and also if Bin Ladin, he needs bank something, he use account for that.

Q. Did he handle money during the travel?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were the accounts held? In what countries?

A. In Sudan and is in Bank Tadamon Islami [Tadamon Islamic Bank].⁴²

Tadamon Islamic Bank is also a shareholder of Al Shamal Islamic Bank, which, as noted above, was formed in Sudan in April 1983. Tadamon Islamic Bank joined the provisional Board of Directors on July 1988 and has been a main shareholder of Al Shamal Islamic Bank since March 26, 1986.⁴³

During its five years in Sudan, al Qaeda grew into a sophisticated organization. Several key figures in the organization portrayed al Qaeda at the time as a multinational corporation complete with a finance committee, investments and well-organized, concealed accounts and operations worldwide. These activities were clearly facilitated by the Sudanese government.

⁴⁰ Hilzenrath, David S. and Mintz, John, "European Bank Regulators Help Track al Qaeda Assets; Reports Solicited on Contact With Banks Tied to Bin Ladin," *The Washington Post*, September 29, 2001, at A19.

⁴¹ Sudan Commercial Directory online-Tadamon Islamic Bank, <http://www.sudancom.com/tadamon.htm>, accessed May 3, 2004.

⁴² USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, pg. 333-334, February 6, 2001.

⁴³ Web Archive-Shamal Bank Website, <http://web.archive.org/web/20011012232453/http://www.shamalbank.com/Statment.htm>, accessed January 4, 2014.

Training Camps in Sudan and Terrorist Attacks During al Qaeda's Years in Sudan

One of Osama Bin Ladin's main activities during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan was creating and financing training camps, where volunteers would learn how to fight. Those camps remained open in Afghanistan after the end of war with the Soviet Union. When Bin Ladin moved to Sudan, he set up several terrorist training camps throughout the country, the main one being a 20-acre site near Soba,⁴⁴ 10 kilometers south of Khartoum. Osama bin Ladin and al Qaeda were allowed to operate freely in Sudan. Al Qaeda purchased communications equipment, radios, and rifles for the Sudanese NIF,⁴⁵ while the Sudanese government provided 200 passports to al Qaeda so that, in exchange, terrorists could travel widely with new identities.⁴⁶

Important information al Qaeda's training camps in Sudan and the involvement of the Sudanese government came from Jamal al-Fadl's testimony. In or about the early 1990's, Jamal al-Fadl went to Hilat Koko, a suburb of Khartoum, where he met with representatives of al Qaeda and the Sudanese army to discuss the joint manufacture of chemical weapons.⁴⁷ At this time, al Qaeda was also experimenting with biological warfare -- injecting or gassing dogs with cyanide.⁴⁸

Al-Fadl testified about the cooperation between the NIF and al Qaeda on chemical weapons:

Q. Did you ever travel to the section of Khartoum called Hilat Koko with any member of al Qaeda?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Who did you go with?

A. I remember one time I went with Abu Rida al Suri, and one time I went with Abu Hajer al Iraqi.

Q. Anyone else?

A. And one time I went with --

Q. We will go through that name. M-U-Q-A-D-E-M. Is that a name or a title?

A. No, a title. He got one eagle and one star.

Q. Does that mean he is an officer?

⁴⁴ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Transcript of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 262-264, February 6, 2001.

⁴⁵ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 353, February 7, 2001.

⁴⁶ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 440-442, February 13, 2001.

⁴⁷ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 291-293, February 6, 2001.

⁴⁸ Miller, Judith, "Qaeda Videos Seem to Show Chemical Tests," The New York Times, August 19, 2002, pg.1.

A. Yes, he is in the army.

Q. In which army?

A. Sudanese army.

Q. His name?

A. Yes. Abdul Baset Hamza.

Q. Tell us about the time you went to Hilat Koko with Abu Hajer al Iraqi, what you discussed.

A. I learn that in this building they try to make chemical 14 weapons with regular weapons.

Q. Can you explain what you mean by chemical weapons with regular weapons.

A. I remember another guy, he explain more to me about this.

Q. Who was that?

A. Amin Abdel Marouf.

Q. What did Amin Abdel Marouf explain to you?

A. He say the war between the government and the Sudan and the rebels in south Lebanon, it's like 30 years, and always the rebels during the rain time, they took the Sudanese army to north, and he say if we use weapons like that, it easy for us to win.

Q. Was there a war going on in the south of Sudan?

A. Yes.

Q. That was between who and whom?

A. Between Islamic National Front, they run the government, and John Garang group.

Q. Returning to your conversation with Abu Hajer al Iraqi, did he discuss with you who it was that was trying to make the chemical weapons in the area there of Hilat Koko?

A. He tell me the al Qaeda group try to help Islamic National Front to do these weapons, to make these weapons⁴⁹.

Part of al-Fadl's testimony revealed the close relationship between al Qaeda and the Sudanese authorities. Al-Fadl refers to the "Egyptian Jihad Group", which is the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). EIJ has always been very close to al Qaeda and today can be considered an organization merged with al Qaeda. The two groups formally merged in 1998, when they announced the formation of the "World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders."

A. I remember the Egyptian Jihad Group, they got training inside the farm, and the explosive make noise, and the residential not far from the farm, they complain about that and they go to the local police and tell them it's a big noise come from the farm, and the police come to the farm, but we call the intelligence office because we have relationship with them, and the intelligence office came and they tell the local police we take care of that, and don't worry about that. And they take us to the jail, and they say you shouldn't do that, we tell you to refresh, not to make real explosives.⁵⁰

Additional Sudanese Government Assistance to al Qaeda

In his testimony, al-Fadl discussed how a member of the Sudanese army assisted al Qaeda:

Q. While you were in the Sudan, how did al Qaeda in Khartoum maintain contact with the facilities in Damazine in the south and Port Sudan on the Khost by the Red Sea?

A. We got radio.

Q. You mentioned a radio. And was there any discussion in Al Qaeda of why you used a radio rather than the telephone?

A. Because it's more safety when you talk.

Q. Did you know who in Al Qaeda or who arranged to provide the radio system that was used to maintain contact?

A. Muqadem Abdul Basit Hamza and Abu Hajer al Iraqi.

Q. You said Muqadem Abdul Basit Hamza. Again, is that the person that you said was an officer of the Sudanese army?

⁴⁹ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 291-293, February 6, 2001.

⁵⁰ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 223, February 6, 2001.

A. Yes.

Q. During the time that you were in the Sudan, did anyone in al Qaeda have a satellite telephone?

A. Yeah, we got one.

Q. Who used the satellite telephone?

A. Abu Abdallah Bin Ladin.⁵¹

Al-Fadl also explained that the Sudanese government helped al Qaeda operatives obtain documents:

Q. And I gather now when you got to Sudan -- and I'm talking now after 1991 -- you were even able to obtain passports from the Sudanese government; is that correct?

A. Yes, we got a couple hundred.

Q. Okay, for your members of al Qaeda so they could travel outside the Sudan; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And these were again false passports; is that right?

A. No.

Q. All right, they were real passports?

A. Yes, real passport.

Q. For real people?

A. Yes, and making Sudanese citizenships.

Q. And giving them Sudanese citizenship?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these people, were all these people actually citizens Sudan?

A. No.

⁵¹ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Transcript of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 308, February 6, 2001.

Q. And also, al Qaeda developed ways of hiding the fact that their members were traveling, is that true?

A. I don't understand that.

Q. When al Qaeda members would travel and they did not want to be shown to be a member of al Qaeda or even a Muslim, they would -- they might shave their beard?

A. Yes.

Q. They might take magazines which a Muslim would not ordinarily read?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. They might carry, as you mentioned, cigarettes, even though it was prohibited to smoke?

A. Yes.

Q. As a means of escaping detection when they went through Customs; is that right?

A. Yes.⁵²

In addition to providing some al Qaeda operatives with new passports, Sudanese officials also made sure that al Qaeda members traveling to Sudan with different passports could enter and leave the country without having their passports stamped. This was done because a stamp from Sudan (a country known for its support of terrorism) would have raised the attention of immigration officials in other countries:

Q. When you traveled outside of the Sudan, would your passport always be stamped?

A. Sometimes no.

Q. Can you tell us how you could travel without having your passport stamped.

A. If you want me explain that, like what I say before here, we have something called delegation office, and if I want to travel to country, I don't want them to see

⁵² USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Transcript of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 441-442, February 13, 2001.

I come from Sudan, one of the delegation officers, he go to the immigration airport, and he took me through other way, that's means immigration not going to stamp my passport.⁵³

According to the indictment in the Africa Embassy Bombing case, at various times approximately between 1992 and 1996, Osama bin Ladin and one of his lieutenants, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, worked together with a ranking official in the NIF in order to obtain communications equipment on behalf of the Sudanese intelligence service.⁵⁴ The same indictment stated that on at least two occasions in the period from approximately 1992 until 1995, members of al Qaeda allegedly transported weapons and explosives from Khartoum to the coastal city of Port Sudan for trans-shipment to the Arabian peninsula, using vehicles associated with Osama bin Ladin's "businesses."⁵⁵ In 1993, al Qaeda paid \$210,000 for an airplane in Tucson, Arizona, that was then flown to Khartoum, Sudan. This plane was intended to transport American Stinger Anti-Aircraft missiles from Pakistan to Sudan, although that missile transport did not take place.⁵⁶ All these activities happened under the watchful eyes of Sudanese authorities, who allowed al Qaeda to operate freely. The Sudanese government allowed these activities both because it received large amounts of money from Bin Ladin and because it shared a radical Islamic ideology with him.

Because of Sudan's active support for terrorism, the U.S. State Department put Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993.⁵⁷ Sudan also played host and provided logistical support to several other terrorist organizations, which cooperated and trained with al Qaeda, forging alliances that are still important today. For example in 1995, Hassan al-Turabi organized an Islamic Peoples Congress where Osama bin Ladin was able to meet with militant groups from Pakistan, Algeria and Tunisia, as well as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.⁵⁸ During the time that al Qaeda was based in Sudan, it forged alliances with Egyptian Islamic groups and other extremist groups. Bin Ladin's work force grew to include militant Afghan war veterans seeking to avoid a return to their own countries, where many stood accused of subversive and terrorist activities.⁵⁹ For example, according to the State Department, in May 1993, Bin Ladin financed the travel of 300 to 480 Afghan war veterans to Sudan after Islamabad launched a crackdown against extremists lingering in Pakistan.⁶⁰

In addition to offering safe haven in Sudan, Bin Ladin has provided financial support to militants actively opposed to moderate Islamic governments and the West.⁶¹ In fact, during al Qaeda's time in the Sudan, al Qaeda either financed or carried out several attacks throughout the world, proving that the attack on the USS Cole and 9/11 are only

⁵³ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 285-286, February 6, 2001.

⁵⁴ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Superseding Indictment, Pg. 16 ¶m, April 16, 2001.

⁵⁵ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Superseding Indictment, Pg. 20 ¶aa, April 16, 2001.

⁵⁶ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Essam al Ridi, pg. 561-564, February 14, 2001.

⁵⁷ State Department, Office of the Secretary of State, "Determination Sudan," Federal Register, Public Notice 1878, 58 FR 52523, Vol. 58, No. 194, October 8, 1993.

⁵⁸ Alexander, Yonah, "Sudan, the New Iran," Jerusalem Post, July 5, 1995.

⁵⁹ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

⁶⁰ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

⁶¹ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

part of a war that was waged by al Qaeda since the day it was founded. During al Qaeda's five years in Sudan, the group carried out the following attacks:

- In December 1992, Islamic extremists attempted to bomb a hotel in Aden, Yemen that was housing 100 U.S. servicemen who were billeted there to support U.N. relief operations in Somalia. The perpetrators claimed that Bin Ladin financed their group.⁶² This was al Qaeda's first attack against US forces in Yemen and was an ominous precursor to the bombing of the USS Cole. The failed attack on the hotel (in which only two Austrian tourists died because US forces had already left) shows that al Qaeda has always aimed to attack American military targets in the Arabian Peninsula (mostly because the American presence is perceived as an invasion of land sacred to Muslims). Former FBI Director Louis Freeh confirmed al Qaeda's role in the 1992 attack in Yemen during his April 2004 testimony before the 9/11 Commission.⁶³
- Bin Ladin told CNN in 1997 that one of his proudest achievements while he was based in Sudan was the role of his Afghan Arabs in the 1993 killings of more than a dozen American soldiers stationed in Somalia as part of a UN mission to feed starving Somalis.⁶⁴

Moreover, according to a 1996 State Department Fact Sheet:

- By January 1994, Bin Ladin had begun financing at least three terrorist training camps in northern Sudan (camp residents included Egyptian, Algerian, Tunisian and Palestinian extremists) in cooperation with the NIF. Bin Ladin's Al-Hijrah for Construction and Development worked directly with Sudanese military officials to transport and provision terrorists training in such camps.⁶⁵
- A joint Egyptian-Saudi investigation revealed in May 1993 that Bin Ladin business interests helped funnel money to Egyptian extremists, who used the cash to buy unspecified equipment, printing presses, and weapons.⁶⁶
- Bin Ladin was the key financier behind the Kunar' camp in Afghanistan, which provide terrorist training to al-Jihad and al-Gama'at al-Islamiyyah members, according to suspect terrorists captured by Egyptian authorities.⁶⁷

In addition to the failed attack on US forces in Aden, during the five years al Qaeda was based in Sudan, the group kept close ties with radical Islamic militants in Yemen. An example of this cooperation comes, once again, from the testimony of Jamal Al-Fadl.

Q. How did you become involved in moving weapons and explosives?

⁶² State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

⁶³ Testimony of Louis Freeh, Former Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, April 13, 2004.

⁶⁴ Bergen, Peter. "Interview with Osama Bin Ladin." CNN Website, March 1997.

⁶⁵ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

⁶⁶ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

⁶⁷ State Department Fact Sheet, "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," August 14, 1996.

A. I remember Abu Fahdl al Makkee, he told me go to Ayoub al Iraqi.

Q. Just so we are clear, was that the same person who was the first emir of al Qaeda back in Afghanistan?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what happened?

A. He told me the Yemeni Communists, they try to take the government in Yemen.

Q. What did he tell you should do about that?

A. He say we try to give our brothers in south Yemen some weapons to help them to fight the Communists.

Q. What did you then do?

A. I went to Abu al Iraqi, and he told me I need to go with Abu Naem al Liby to the Port Sudan.

Q. What did you do then?

A. I went and I met Abu Naem al Liby, and he tell me we going to go in two days. He told me, and I want you to meet me in hangar, in Soba farm hangar. [Bin Ladin's Farm] I went over there, and we baggage, four baggage in his truck, one -

Q. Let's go slowly. You went to Soba and you met Abu Iraqi, and you mentioned package. Can you tell the Arabic interpreter what word you are using for package.

THE INTERPRETER: Crate with weapons in it.

MR. SCHMIDT: I am sorry. I did not understand.

THE INTERPRETER: Crate, C-R-A-T-E, with weapons in it.

Q. How many crates or big boxes were there?

A. I remember four.

Q. Where were they?

A. They are in hangar in Soba farm.

Q. Can you describe what the hangar looks like.

A. It could be four times like this place.

Q. Is it a place like an airplane hanger, where airplanes are kept in the airport?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. What happened to these four large boxes?

A. I remember I went with him and other guy, his name Abu Ali Sudani, and Abu Ali, he work with delegation office. He is Islamic National Front membership and also he is intelligence officer in the government, and also sometimes he is one of the security for our group.

Q. So this Abu Ali was part of the National Islamic Front, the intelligence office in the Sudan, and helped with security with the group?

A. In delegation office.

Q. What happened then?

A. We went to Port Sudan, and we leave the truck outside the city, and we went to Palace Hotel.

Q. How did you get from Khartoum to Port Sudan?

A. We took the route.

Q. How long a drive was that?

A. 1,100 kilometers.

Q. You went to the Palace Hotel. Can you tell us, forgetting your night in the hotel, what did you do with the boxes?

A. When we went to the hotel, I meet Abu Ayoub al Iraqi and Mohamed Jara al Nabi, and they came together and we took the truck and we went to army base.

Q. The persons you were with were Abu Ayoub al Iraqi and Mohamed Jara al Nabi. What did you do when the two of them and you went to the army base?

A. We stop over there outside until Mohamed Jara al Nabi and Abu Ayoub al Iraqi went inside, and they give paperwork for the army office and they came back and let us go in one of the hangar in army base.

Q. Were the boxes or crates still in the truck?

A. When we went inside hanger, they change the box to another truck.

Q. Did you see anything else inside the hanger?

A. I remember it's all tank and military supplies.

Q. You said what type of tank?

A. I believe D55.

Q. But a military tank?

A. Yes, Sudanese army military tank.

Q. Then what happened to the crates or boxes?

A. In the midnight they took them to the port, north port. It all belong to the Sudanese army.

Q. You said at what time of day?

A. Midnight.

Q. What happened when the crates were brought to the port at midnight?

A. They shipped the boxes to the boat.

Q. Which boat?

A. It's our group boat.

Q. Who do you mean by our group?

A. It's al Qaeda member boat.

Q. What did it look like?

A. It's, I believe like 60 or 50 meter tall.

Q. What color is it?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you know who was in charge of the boat?

A. Yes, Abu Habib al Pakistani and Abu Mohamed al Yemeni.

Q. Does that mean he is from Pakistan?

A. Yes.

Q. The other person you said was?

A. Abu Mohamed al Yemeni.

Q. What happened then?

A. They put the box in the boat and after that, me and Abu Neam, we went.

Q. That was you and Abu Neam, the person you mentioned was Libyan before?

A. Yes. He is the truck driver.

Q. Did you ever actually open the crates and look inside yourself and see what was in there?

A. No.

Q. What did they tell you was in the crates?

A. Abu Khabuib al Sudani, he told me it's weapons to Saif

Islam Jannubi group in Yemen.

Q. The person who told you that the weapons were going to the Saif Islam Jannubi group was whom?

A. Abu Khabuib al Sudani.

Q. Abu Khabuib al Sudani was a member of the al Qaeda?

A. Yes, and also Abu Fadl al Makkee, he told me when I went back to Khartoum.

Q. When you went to Khartoum, what did Abu Fadl al Makkee tell you?

A. I remember he told me we try to help the Yemeni people group because the Communists try to take the government in Yemen.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 336-340, February 6, 2001.

Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl also testified that al Qaeda cargo shipments of weapons went from Afghanistan to Sudan:

Q. Sir, you testified this morning about the time at which al Qaeda relocated from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Sudan, and you testified about how you brought some money. Did you have a conversation with any members of al Qaeda as to other equipment that was brought from Afghanistan or Pakistan to the Sudan?

A. Yes.

Q. Who did you speak with?

A. Abu Fadhl al Makkee. Abu Rida al Suri.

Q. What did they tell you about other things brought from Afghanistan to the Sudan?

A. They say we have some of our weapons in Afghanistan and want to bring it to Sudan.

Q. Did they describe what type of weapons they wanted to bring to the Sudan?

A. I remember --

MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, objection, unless we are going to identify which one of these individuals.

MR. FITZGERALD: OK.

Q. What did Abu Fadhl al Makkee tell you about the weapons?

A. He tell me we have Milan and Stinger, we want to bring it to Sudan.

Q. Can you explain to the jury first what Milan refers to.

A. Milan, it's a rocket. We use it against tanks.

Q. Besides the Milan rocket, can you tell us what a Stinger is.

A. We have a Stinger number 3 also. We use it against airplane.

Q. Did Abu Fadhl al Makkee tell you how they wished to get the Milan rockets and the Stingers to the Sudan?

MR. SCHMIDT: Objection, your Honor, again combining the two individuals.

THE COURT: Who was speaking?

MR. FITZGERALD: I asked about one person, Abu Fadhl al Makkee.

Q. Did he tell you how they were going to get the Milan rockets and the Stingers to the Sudan? Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. What did Abu Fadhl al Makkee tell you?

A. He tell me that we have Milan and Stinger, we need to bring it from Pakistan to Sudan.

Q. Just going with Abu Fadl al Makkee, did he tell you how they were going to get the rockets and the Stingers from Afghanistan to the Sudan?

A. He tell me they rent one of the Sudan airways plane and it's cargo plane, to help them, and he tell me we want to take some supplies from Sudan, sugar for Afghani people, and when the cargo come back, we want to bring our supplies, our weapons.⁶⁹

In another part of his testimony, al-Fadl explained the military cooperation between the Sudanese NIF and Bin Ladin:

Q. What if anything did Bin Ladin say?

A. He say our agenda is bigger than business. We not going to make business here, but we need to help the government and the government help our group, and this is our purpose.

Q. Are you familiar with something known as the Defaa al Shabi?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain to the jury what the Defaa al Shabi is.

A. Defaa al Shabi is the Islamic National Front. They make army under the Sudanese army. They just say bring the students from the college and from high school and they give them training, they try to use him in war in southern Sudan against Christians.

Q. Did the al Qaeda provide any assistance to the Defaa al Shabi?

A. Yes.

⁶⁹ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 272-273, February 7, 2001.

Q. What did the al Qaeda provide?

A. We buy for them communications for the offices, and also like radio and telephone, and also we buy Kalashnikovs for them.⁷⁰

Sudan, Yemen, and Al Qaeda

Yemeni Islamic extremists have always played a crucial role in the worldwide jihad waged by Osama Bin Ladin. First, Bin Ladin's father was born in the Yemeni region of Hadramaut⁷¹ and Usama has always given special attention to Yemen. Yemen made significant contributions to the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was during this war that a group of men, guided by the words of Palestinian sheik Abdullah Azzam, decided to create an organization to wage jihad against all those they considered enemies of Islam. This organization is al Qaeda. Osama Bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawahiri, currently al Qaeda's number 1 and 2, were among these men. Among the most prominent figures of the organization was (and still is) Sheik Abdul Majid al Zindani, a prominent Yemeni cleric and member of the al Islah Party.

Reports describe Zindani as Bin Ladin's "mentor."⁷² From 1984 until the end of that decade, Al-Zindani sent between 5000 and 7000 Arabs, including Yemenis, to Afghanistan and Pakistan via Saudi Arabia for military training and religious teaching under his guidance.⁷³ After the war in Afghanistan ended al Zindani remained an active supporter of al Qaeda. A 1995 State Department cable about the Jordanian trial of radical Islamists who bombed a movie theater in Jordan proves that al Zindani was still cooperating with Bin Ladin when Bin Ladin was in Sudan.⁷⁴ The cable states that: "The third defendant, Zakariya, stayed for three months in one of the military camps belonging to Bin Ladin, during which he was trained in how to assemble handmade bombs and how to detonate bombs by remote control, using children's electronic toys. He also learned how to produce toxic materials. He also received \$10,000 from Abd-al Majid al Zandani."⁷⁵

Sheik Zindani is a prominent figure in the worldwide jihad and has ties to radicals throughout the world. Zindani, who was designated as a supporter of terrorism by the U.S. Treasury Department on February 24, 2004,⁷⁶ has a long-standing relationship with Hassan al Turabi, the former leader of Sudan who invited Bin Ladin to Sudan. Besides

⁷⁰ USA v. Bin Ladin, et al., SDNY 98-CR-1023, Trial Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, pg. 353, February 7, 2001.

⁷¹ Burke, Jason, "The Making of the World's Most Wanted Man," *The Guardian*, October 28, 2001.

⁷² O'Neill, Brian, "US Puts Yemen in a Bind over 'Terror' Sheikh," *Asia Times*, April 2, 2004.

⁷³ Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1, 1995, Vol. 7; No. 4; pg. 175 cited in Karmon, Ely, "The Bombing of the USS Cole: An Analysis of the Principal Suspects." International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism Website, October 25, 2000, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/Cole_bombing.htm

⁷⁴ State Department Cable, "Prosecutor Issues 'Explosions' Case Indictment," Date illegible.

⁷⁵ State Department Cable, "Prosecutor Issues 'Explosions' Case Indictment," Date illegible.

⁷⁶ Treasury Department, "United States Designates Bin Ladin Loyalist," February 24, 2004, <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1190.htm>.

several visits paid by Turabi to Yemen and by Zindani to Sudan, the relationship between the two is proven by their membership in the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference, a loose hierarchy of radical clerics and politicians from the Muslim world that openly advocates violence to defeat the enemies of Islam. In 1995, Turabi chaired the Conference, while Zindani was one of its top officials.⁷⁷ The *Yemen Times*,⁷⁸ described Zindani as a friend of Turabi. Moreover, Zindani headed a delegation of clerics that in April of 2001 traveled to Sudan to negotiate the release of Turabi with Sudanese President Omar al Bashir.⁷⁹

The testimony of Al-Fadl reported at page 18 has proven that al Qaeda was shipping weapons from Sudan to the Northern Yemeni forces during the Yemeni civil war. It is noteworthy that Zindani played a major role during the civil war,⁸⁰ rallying his "Arab Afghans" to fight on behalf of the North.⁸¹ Some analysts put the numbers of fighters recruited by Zindani to fight against the South in the thousands.⁸² Not only al Qaeda, but allegedly the Sudanese government itself also helped the North during the Yemeni civil war. The Southern government repeatedly accused Sudan of shipping arms to the North.⁸³ The Sudanese government has always denied these accusations.⁸⁴

The radical Sudanese government and Yemeni Islamists cooperated for several years. Al Qaeda, which was headquartered in Sudan and had a strong foothold in Yemen, often served as the go-between, facilitating the contacts between them. For example, in January 1997, according to a BBC translation, the Yemeni opposition newspaper, *Al Ittihad al Dawliyyah*, reported that Sudan's NIF leaders in Khartoum received a contingent of terrorists from Yemen and that the contingent was sent by Al Zindani to be trained in NIF-sponsored camps.⁸⁵ By the same token, while Zindani was sending militants to Sudan for training under the supervision of the NIF, in the mid-'90s trained al Qaeda militants moved to Yemen under the supervision of al Zindani. Reports from the highly influential Arab newspaper *Al Watan al Arabi* reveal that in 1997 Bin Ladin had "substantial business interests" in Yemen, where he "works in cooperation with members of the Yemeni Alliance for Reform (Islah)." ⁸⁶

Another example of cooperation between radical Islamists in Yemen and the Sudanese government comes from evidence gathered by an Egyptian military court during the 1994

⁷⁷ Segev, Shmuel, "Iran Continues to Forge Sudan Connections," *The Jerusalem Post*, January 4, 1995.

⁷⁸ "Islah prepares for visit from speaker of former Sudanese govt" Middle East News Item, December 29, 1999

⁷⁹ "Sudanese president announces failure of Islamic mediation with Turabi" Agence France Press, April 15, 2001

⁸⁰ O'Neill, Brian, "US Puts Yemen in a Bind Over Terror Sheikh," *Asia Times*, April 2, 2004.

⁸¹ The Arab volunteers who fought in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviets are commonly referred to "Arab Afghans." Abdel Majid al Zindani was the undisputed leader of the Arab Afghans that resided in Yemen.

⁸² Hawthorne, Amy, "Yemen and the Fight against Terror," *Policywatch*, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, Oct 11, 2001.

⁸³ Bol, Nhial, "Khartoum Denies Involvement in Conflicts," *Inter Press Service*, May 10, 1994.

⁸⁴ Bol, Nhial, "Khartoum Urges Yemeni Leaders to Resort to Dialogue," *Inter Press Service*, May 19, 1994.

⁸⁵ "Opposition Radio says Fundamentalists Terrorists from Yemen Trained in Sudan," January 31, 1997, BBC Translation of Voice of Sudan, in Arabic, January 30, 1997.

⁸⁶ Islah is Zindani's political party.

trial of two militants, Ahmed Mohammed Gomaa and Sherif Mohammed Hassan.⁸⁷ The court said the two who were sentenced to death had received espionage training in Sudan and terrorist training in both Sudan and Yemen.⁸⁸

Zindani, Turabi (and therefore the Sudanese government) and Bin Ladin, united by the same extremist ideology, worked together for more than a decade. Zindani is Bin Ladin's man in Yemen and worked together with the Sudanese government in supporting al Qaeda throughout the '90s. It is therefore important to note what Hamood Abdulhamid Hitar, a judge in Yemen's High Court, said about Zindani's involvement in the USS Cole bombing.⁸⁹ Hitar revealed that several prisoners held in connection with the attack on the USS Cole have told local authorities that Al Zindani issued a decree ordering the strike.⁹⁰ Officials in Zindani's al Islah party have denied the accusation.⁹¹

But even if Zindani did not play a direct role in the bombing, for years the Yemeni cleric has been the most important al Qaeda representative in Yemen, playing a significant role in fundraising and recruiting. His close cooperation with Sudanese authority is another example of how Sudan has been for years involved in al Qaeda activities that have resulted in attacks beyond Sudanese territory, Yemen included.

According to press reports, one of the key planners of the USS Cole bombing and al Qaeda chief of operations in Yemen, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, met with Bin Ladin in Sudan.⁹² The FBI called al-Harethi al Qaeda's "godfather in Yemen."⁹³ According to the *Times of London*,⁹⁴ the *al-Sahwa* newspaper⁹⁵ reported on November 4, 2002 that Abu Ali had been a close companion of bin Ladin when al-Qaeda had its headquarters in Sudan. Bin Ladin is reported to have sent his old friend to Yemen to investigate the possibility of moving there.⁹⁶ More information on al-Harethi is provided in the attached memo on the individuals involved in the attack on the USS Cole.

Moreover, the attack against the USS Cole did not happen in a vacuum. It was clearly part of a strategy to attack US troops in the Middle East. Attacks that preceded (Somalia, Khobar Towers, and the failed attack on the USS The Sullivans⁹⁷) and followed (attacks

⁸⁷ Ghalwash, Mae, "Death Sentence for Two Militants," *Agence France Press*, September 20, 1994.

⁸⁸ Ghalwash, Mae, "Death Sentence for Two Militants," *Agence France Press*, September 20, 1994.

⁸⁹ Slackman, Michael, "Yemeni Religious Leader Tied to Cole," *The Los Angeles Times*, January 15, 2003.

⁹⁰ Slackman, Michael, "Yemeni Religious Leader Tied to Cole," *The Los Angeles Times*, January 15, 2003.

⁹¹ Slackman, Michael, "Yemeni Religious Leader Tied to Cole," *The Los Angeles Times*, January 15, 2003.

⁹² "Yemen Arrests Mastermind of Attacks on USS Cole," *Fox News*, November 25, 2003, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,104067,00.html>

⁹³ Monaghan, Elaine and McGrory, Daniel, "Death of Terror Chief Deals Severe Blow to al-Qaeda," *The Times of London*, November 5, 2002.

⁹⁴ Monaghan, Elaine and McGrory, Daniel, "Death of Terror Chief Deals Severe Blow to al-Qaeda," *The Times of London*, November 5, 2002.

⁹⁵ *Al Sahwa* is the official newspaper of Zindani's Islah party. http://www.interet-general.info/article.php3?id_article=598

⁹⁶ Monaghan, Elaine and McGrory, Daniel, "Death of Terror Chief Deals Severe Blow to al-Qaeda," *The Times of London*, November 5, 2002.

⁹⁷ In January 2000, al Qaeda operatives attempted to use a small boat to bomb the USS *The Sullivans* while it refueled in Aden. The explosives-laden boat sank before it could reach its target. This botched assault is considered to be a precursor to the bombing of the *Cole*, which used the same tactic. See: "Cole Attack was Terrorists' Second Try, U.S. Officials Say," CNN, November 9, 2000, <http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/11/09/uss.cole.02/>

on US forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) the bombing of the USS Cole show the continuity in al Qaeda's strategy. A significant example is provided by the story of a telephone number in Yemen that al Qaeda operatives linked to several plots over the years have all used.

As noted in a February 2002 *Washington Post* report on Sameer al-Hada, who blew himself up with a hand grenade after being cornered by Yemeni security police outside the capital of Sanaa,⁹⁸ Al-Hada was a member of a clan that has been linked by U.S. investigators to three al Qaeda attacks: the 1998 Africa Embassy bombing, the bombing of the USS Cole and the September 11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon.⁹⁹ The *Post* reported that a cell phone number traced to the clan has been used for years as a "switchboard" by al Qaeda leaders, and had been linked to the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, according to evidence presented by U.S. prosecutors in the case.¹⁰⁰ FBI investigators have subsequently tied the same telephone number to the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole and to some of the Sept. 11 hijackers, according to the *Washington Post* article.¹⁰¹

One of the hijacking leaders, Khalid Almihdhar, who was married to al-Hada's sister, is known to have called the number, according to U.S. officials.¹⁰² The Yemen connection to al Qaeda surfaced frequently also in the 2001 Embassy bombing trial. One of the convicted defendants, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Owhali, traveled to Yemen in the months before the bombings and was given the al-Hada phone number to reach a contact named in the court transcript as Ahmed al Hazza.¹⁰³ Sources said that "al Hazza" is merely another way to spell al-Hada's name.¹⁰⁴ According to trial testimony, Owhali made calls to the number both before and after the Nairobi attack, including efforts to get money and a passport in order to leave Kenya. The same number received two calls from bin Ladin's satellite phone in the middle of Owhali's attempts.¹⁰⁵ The al Hada story proves that al Qaeda is a transnational organization, whose members have been trained and operate in different parts of the world, but share the same goal. The foundations of this organization were laid in Sudan, where al Qaeda was able to operate freely for more than five years.

The thesis that the USS Cole just represents a step in al Qaeda's plan to attack US interests in the Middle East and that such a plan was conceived as early as 1989 is also

⁹⁸ Eggen, Dan and Walter Pincus, "US, Yemen Step up Anti Terror Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2002.

⁹⁹ Eggen, Dan and Walter Pincus, "US, Yemen Step up Anti Terror Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2002.

¹⁰⁰ Eggen, Dan and Walter Pincus, "US, Yemen Step up Anti Terror Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2002.

¹⁰¹ Eggen, Dan and Walter Pincus, "US, Yemen Step up Anti Terror Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2002.

¹⁰² Eggen, Dan and Walter Pincus, "US, Yemen Step up Anti Terror Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2002.

¹⁰³ Eggen, Dan and Walter Pincus, "US, Yemen Step up Anti Terror Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2002.

¹⁰⁴ Eggen, Dan and Walter Pincus, "US, Yemen Step up Anti Terror Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2002.

¹⁰⁵ Eggen, Dan and Pincus, Walter, "US, Yemen Step up Anti Terror Cooperation," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2002.

sustained by the US government. In fact, the indictment of two of the perpetrators of the attack on the USS Cole, Jamal Badawi and Fahd Quso,¹⁰⁶ clearly states that:

At various times from at least as early as 1989 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, coconspirator Usama Bin Ladin, and others known and unknown, engaged in financial and business transactions on behalf of al Qaeda, including, but not limited to: purchasing land for training camps; purchasing warehouses for storage of items, including explosives; purchasing communication and electronics equipment; transferring funds between corporate accounts; and transporting currency and weapons to members of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups. To carry out some of these transactions, the defendants BADAWI, and QUSO traveled on behalf of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups to various places, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Thailand.

Fatwas

The glue that keeps al Qaeda's operatives together is their religious fanaticism. Fatwas (Islamic religious decrees) issued by al Qaeda's religious committee, bind all its operatives. A fatwa marking US forces in the Arabian Peninsula as targets was issued for the first time in 1992, when al Qaeda was headquartered in Sudan. Osama bin Ladin and al Qaeda have shown a prolonged willingness to strike at US military targets in the Arabian Peninsula. Bin Ladin and al Qaeda perceive the presence of US forces in the Arabian Peninsula as an invasion and they have repeatedly issued fatwas threatening and providing the religious justification for attacks against US forces in the region.

One of these fatwas, issued in 1996,¹⁰⁷ is significantly entitled "Message from Usamah Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Expel the Heretics from the Arabian Peninsula." The 1996 fatwa underlined the importance of Yemen to al Qaeda, stating that "[t]he presence of a population of fighters in the south of Yemen, fighting in the cause of Allah, is a strategic threat to the Zionist-Crusaders alliance in the area."

Over the years, fatwas and tapes sent to the media by Bin Ladin have repeatedly stated that one of al Qaeda's main reasons of enmity against the US is the presence of American troops in the Arabian Peninsula. But it is extremely important for the case that the first fatwa condemning the presence of US troops in the Arabian Peninsula was issued in 1992, when Bin Ladin was in Sudan. In fact, the indictment of two men charged for their role in the bombing of the USS Cole reveals that "[a]t various times in or about 1992, coconspirator Usama Bin Ladin, working together with members of the fatwa committee of al Qaeda, disseminated fatwas (rulings on Islamic law) to other members and associates of al Qaeda that the United States forces stationed on the Arabian Peninsula, including both Saudi Arabia and Yemen, should be attacked."¹⁰⁸ This proves that the idea

¹⁰⁶ USA v. Al-Badawi, et al. SDNY S12 98-CR-1023. Indictment, pg. 9-I, May 15, 2003.

¹⁰⁷ USA v. Al-Badawi, et al. SDNY S12 98-CR-1023. Indictment, pg. 9-j, May 15, 2003.

¹⁰⁸ USA v. Al-Badawi, et al. SDNY S12 98-CR-1023. Indictment, pg. 9-j, May 15, 2003.

of attacking US troops in the Arabian Peninsula (and here Yemen is specifically mentioned) was, if not conceived, at least carefully considered during Bin Ladin's stay in Sudan.

State Department Designation

Sudan was designated as a state supporter of international terrorism in 1993. Patterns of Global Terrorism, the annual report issued by the US Department of State, makes it clear that in the years after Bin Ladin's departure and before the attack on the USS Cole, Sudan was still active in supporting terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda.

Patterns of Global Terrorism - 1997¹⁰⁹

Sudan

Sudan in 1997 continued to serve as a haven, meeting place, and training hub for a number of international terrorist organizations, primarily of Middle East origin. The Sudanese Government also condoned many of the objectionable activities of Iran, such as funneling assistance to terrorist and radical Islamic groups operating in and transiting through Sudan. The Department of State in November 1997 announced new comprehensive economic sanctions against Sudan. The sanctions convey the gravity of US concerns about Sudan's continued support for international terrorism and regional opposition groups as well as its abysmal human rights record.

Sudan has not complied with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070 passed in 1996, despite efforts that year by the regime to distance itself somewhat from terrorism, including ordering the departure of terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin. The Security Council's demands include that Sudan cease its support to terrorists and turn over the three Egyptian al-Gama'at fugitives linked to the 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia. President Bashir, consistent with Khartoum's repeated denials that its officials had any foreknowledge of the planning of the event, in October 1997 scoffed at the idea Sudan could be seen to have had anything to do with the attack.

Since Sudan was placed on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in August 1993, the Sudanese Government has continued to harbor members of several of the most violent international terrorist and radical Islamic groups. These groups include Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, and HAMAS. The Sudanese Government also supports regional Islamic and non-Islamic opposition and insurgent groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Tunisia.

Sudan's support to terrorist organizations has included paramilitary training, indoctrination, money, travel documentation, safe passage, and refuge in Sudan. Most of

¹⁰⁹ State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism, 1997.

the organizations present in Sudan maintain offices or other types of representation. They use Sudan as a base to organize some of their operations and to support compatriots elsewhere. Sudan also serves as a transit point and meeting place for several Iranian-backed terrorist groups.

Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998¹¹⁰

Sudan

Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, safehaven, and training hub for a number of international terrorist groups, particularly Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization. The Sudanese Government also condoned many of Iran's objectionable activities, such as funding terrorist and radical Islamic groups operating and transiting Sudan.

Sudan still has not complied fully with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070, passed in 1996, despite the regime's efforts to distance itself publicly from terrorism. The UNSC demands that Sudan end all support to terrorists. It also requires Khartoum to hand over three Egyptian al-Gama'at fugitives linked to the assassination attempt in 1995 against Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia. Sudanese officials continue to deny that they are harboring the three suspects and that they had a role in the attack.

Khartoum continues to provide safehaven to members of several of the world's most violent terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, and HAMAS. Khartoum also supports regional Islamic and non-Islamic opposition and insurgent groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Tunisia.

Sudanese support to terrorists includes provision of paramilitary training, money, religious indoctrination, travel documents, safe passage, and refuge. Most of the organizations in Sudan maintain offices or other types of representation.

In August the United States accused Sudan of involvement in chemical weapons development. On 20 August the United States conducted military strikes against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, which was associated with Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network and believed to be involved in the manufacture of chemical weapons, to prevent an anti-US attack. Sudan has denied that the plant was involved in chemical weapons production and vigorously has protested the US bombing.

¹¹⁰ State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism, 1998.

Statement as to Rate of Pay

I am being paid \$200.00 per hour for my time in this case.

Documents Relied Upon

In addition to the documents identified in the report and footnotes, I may also rely upon the following deposition transcripts:

1. Steve Emerson, attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
2. Douglas Farah, attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
3. James Woolsey, attached hereto as Exhibit "C."

Testimony in the Last Four Years

1. 2012 - *Harrison, et. al. v. Republic of Sudan*, Case No.: 10-1689, United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (Testimony through deposition)

Qualifications

My CV is attached as Exhibit "D."

Page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division

OLIVIA RUX, et al.,)
Plaintiff,)
vs.) C.A. 204 CV 42
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN,)
Defendant.)
* * * *

The videotaped deposition of STEVEN A. EMERSON was taken on Friday, March 2, 2007, commencing at 2:09 p.m., at the offices of Greenberg Traurig, 800 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., before Paula L. Lowery, Notary Public.

* * * *

Page 3

1 APPEARANCES (continued):
2

3 ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT:
4 (No counsel present.)
5

6 ALSO PRESENT:

7 JAMES COOPER, ESQUIRE
8 SCOTT PRESTON, Videographer
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22

Page 2

1 A P P E A R A N C E S
2

3 ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF:
4 ANDREW C. HALL, ESQUIRE
5 MARK E. STEINER, ESQUIRE
6 Hall, Lamb and Hall, P.A.
7 1428 Brickell Avenue
8 Miami, Florida 33131-3491
9 (305) 374-5030
10 (305) 374-5033 - fax
11 msteiner@hihlawfirm.com
12

13 NELSON M. JONES, III
14 Nicholas & Jones
15 440 Louisiana
16 475 Lyric Office Centre
17 Houston, Texas 77002
18 (713) 224-5323
19 (713) 224-8525 - fax
20
21
22

(Appearances continued on the next page.)


Page 4

1 I N D E X
2

3 DEPOSITION OF STEVEN A. EMERSON
4 MARCH 2, 2007

5 EXAMINATION BY: PAGE
6 Mr. Hall 6
7

8 EMERSON DEPOSITION EXHIBITS: PAGE MARKED
9 (No exhibits marked.)
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Page 5

1 PROCEEDINGS

2 - - - - -

3 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Good afternoon. This
4 is the video deposition of Steven Emerson taken by
5 counsel for the plaintiff in the matter of Olivia
6 Rux, et al., vs. Republic of Sudan, held in the
7 United States District Court, Eastern District of
8 Virginia, Civil Action 204 CV 428.

9 The deposition is held today in the
10 offices of Greenberg Traurig, 800 Connecticut
11 Avenue, Washington, D.C., on this date, March 2,
12 2007, at approximately 2:13 p.m.

13 My name is Scott Preston. I'm the video
14 specialist. The court reporter today is
15 Ms. Lowery from the firm of M.A.R. Reporting.

16 Counsel will now introduce themselves.

17 MR. HALL: Andrew Hall, together with
18 James Cooper and Nelson Jones, representing the
19 plaintiff.

20 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: You may now swear in
21 the witness.

22 Whereupon --

Page 6

1 STEVEN A. EMERSON,
2 a witness, called for examination, having been
3 first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
4 follows:

5 EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. HALL:

7 Q. Please state your full name.

8 A. Steven Emerson.

9 Q. Mr. Emerson, in what city do you work?

10 A. In Washington, D.C.

11 Q. How old are you, sir?

12 A. I'm 52 years old.

13 Q. Let's go through your educational
14 background. Would you tell the court your
15 educational background, please.

16 A. I have a combined BA and MA from Brown
17 University.

18 Q. What year did you receive those degrees?

19 A. In '76, '77.

20 Q. What did you get your degrees in?

21 A. I got my BA -- it's been a while. I
22 believe I got it in urban studies, and my MA in

Page 7

1 sociology.

2 Q. Mr. Emerson, do you have a relationship
3 with The Investigative Project?

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. What is that relationship?

6 A. I'm the executive director of The
7 Investigative Project on Terrorism.

8 Q. Would you tell the court exactly what
9 that organization does.

10 A. The organization investigates, analyzes
11 and combats the spread of radical Islamic
12 fundamentalism in the United States and around the
13 world.

14 Q. How long have you been investigating
15 terrorism involving radical fundamentalist Islamic
16 terrorism?

17 A. Formally, as part of the institute since
18 1995, but before that I wrote several books while
19 I was in journalism at CNN, as well as at U.S.
20 News & World Report.

21 Q. Let's go through your career and how you
22 became dedicated to studying and taking positions

Page 8

1 involving terrorism. Tell us the story.

2 A. Well, when I graduated Brown, I came down
3 to Washington. My first job was a graduate
4 internship with the Carnegie Endowment for
5 International Peace. My first full-time career
6 position was a researcher on the U.S. Senate
7 Foreign Relations Committee, and I was assigned to
8 work on the Middle East.

9 Q. How long did you work for the committee?

10 A. I worked for the committee for three
11 years.

12 Q. Researching?

13 A. Primarily the Middle East, as well as
14 some other economic matters. I was ultimately
15 assigned to the Subcommittee for Foreign Economic
16 Policy, but I worked a lot on the Middle East and
17 traveled there multiple times.

18 I left in 1980 as the Senate was
19 reconstituted. I wrote my first book in 1995
20 called The American House of Saud, the Secret
21 Petrol Dollar Connection, about Saudi petrol
22 dollars being recycled in the United States with

Page 9

1 political strings attached.

2 I joined U.S. News & World Report after
3 that as their national security correspondent, and
4 wrote a lot of articles, and I also wrote a book
5 about U.S. counter-terrorist forces called The
6 Secret Warriors Inside the Covert Military
7 Operations of the Reagan Era.

8 Q. And how did you come to be directly
9 involved in doing this as a full-time occupation?

10 A. I became very intellectually stimulated
11 and interested by counter-terrorism, and I could
12 see looking down the tracks that this was going to
13 be a dominant issue in the United States as well
14 as the world. I felt I wanted to attach myself to
15 it, so I focused on this to the exclusion of
16 almost any other issue in terms of reading, in
17 terms of writing books.

18 So all of my books have pertained in one
19 way or the other to the issue of terrorism, and
20 all of my documentaries that I've worked on have
21 pertained to international terrorism, and so have
22 all my jobs.

Page 10

1 Q. How many books have you written on
2 international terrorism, other than the ones you
3 just identified?

4 A. Well, I've written a total of six books.
5 The last one that just came out two months ago
6 called Jihad Incorporated, a Guide to Military
7 Islam in the United States.

8 Q. All on the subject of terrorism?

9 A. Right, except for the first one, The
10 Secret Petrol Dollar Connection, which was about
11 Saudi petrol dollars.

12 Q. You also talked about doing specials or
13 film or television shows.

14 A. Yes, I did a documentary in 1994 called
15 Jihad in America that aired on public television
16 in November of that year, and it won the George
17 Polk Award and the IRE Award. It was recognized
18 as one of the top documentaries that year, and to
19 this day is recognized as the foremost documentary
20 on radical Islam in the United States and still
21 stands up.

22 Q. How did you come to expand your work from

Page 11

1 studying radical Islam in the United States to
2 terrorism involving the radical Islamic movement
3 world wide?

4 A. Because you can't contain radical Islam
5 in the United States. It's not compartmented. If
6 you're studying Hamas in New York, you have to
7 study Hamas in Cairo. If you're studying Al Qaeda
8 in New York, you have to study Al Qaeda in the
9 Sudan. It's the entire globe. That was one of
10 the problems that the FBI experienced. The
11 compartmented it too much.

12 Q. As a result of this effort, you
13 ultimately formed The Investigative Project in
14 what year?

15 A. I formed it in 1995 right after the
16 broadcast of the film Jihad in America.

17 Q. And how many people work at The
18 Investigative Project?

19 A. A total of about 28 people, and then we
20 have some freelancers.

21 Q. And tell us exactly what you do at The
22 Investigative Project on a routine basis to be

Page 12

1 familiar with terrorism and the historic
2 development of terrorism.

3 A. Well, there's really no general routine.
4 We're an unusual organization. People come and
5 sort of look at us as a startup. I look for
6 people that are very creative, who are self
7 starters, who are smart and know how to
8 investigate.

9 We have an incredible database, Probably
10 the largest open-source archival database of its
11 sort on militant Islam. It's a high learning
12 curve to get up to speed on these groups.

13 When one comes there, they're assigned
14 groups to follow, issues to follow and things to
15 investigate. The priorities are assigned either
16 by me, or by the issues of the day in terms of
17 what is being discussed in the news.

18 Q. Is one of the things you study Al Qaeda?

19 A. Al Qaeda is the principal thing we study.

20 Q. Do you study Al Qaeda and its various
21 networking with state sponsors of Al Qaeda?

22 A. We drill down and drill up on Al Qaeda.

Page 13

1 Q. What does "drill down and drill up" mean?

2 A. We look at state sponsorship, and we look
3 at its various incarnations. Basically, how it
4 reincarnates itself. It's reconstituted entities
5 up and down.

6 Q. Do you have investigators in the field in
7 the Middle East as well?

8 A. We have -- I'd rather not disclose the
9 country. It is an Arab county. We have an office
10 there.

11 Q. And do you monitor the newspapers, media,
12 television and radio in the Arab language?

13 A. Yes, we monitor that -- well, we
14 subscribe to a couple of monitoring services,
15 including FBIS.

16 Q. Which is what?

17 A. Foreign Broadcast Information Service run
18 by the CIA, as well as Memory, which is Middle
19 East -- well, it's an incredibly helpful
20 translation service. And our own organization.
21 Of course our own organization collects
22 intelligence from the country in which it

Page 14

1 operates.

2 Q. Do you consult with any government
3 agencies based upon your knowledge and experience?

4 A. We work very closely with numerous
5 government agencies although we're not paid by any
6 of them.

7 Q. When you say very close, you mean you
8 meet with them and provide them with information?

9 A. We provide them with information, or
10 sometimes they provide us with information in
11 order to figure out -- in order for us to figure
12 out how to connect the dots.

13 Q. And that's what you do for them?

14 A. That's one thing we would do for them.
15 Other things we might do would be to help them to
16 initiate an investigation based on intelligence
17 that we collect.

18 Q. Which organizations do you consult with?

19 A. I'm going to tell you the names -- I'm
20 not going to tell you all of the organizations
21 because we're constrained in terms of revealing
22 all of it.

Page 15

1 Q. Just tell me the ones that you feel like
2 you're --

3 A. I can tell you that the FBI is one of
4 them. The Department of Justice is another.

5 Q. Do you consult with any security
6 agencies, or are you not able to say that?

7 A. I am not allowed to tell you that.

8 Q. Have you consulted with any governments
9 other than the United States in order to assist
10 them in their activities against terrorism?

11 A. When I have traveled overseas, I have
12 consulted with the Australian police and
13 Australian intelligence agency. We have been
14 contacted by the MI-5 in Britain, and we've been
15 contacted by the German intelligence organization.

16 Q. Did there come a time based upon your
17 database that I approached you to ask you whether
18 or not you would undertake to review your
19 materials to tell me if there was a relationship
20 between the United States Cole and any state
21 sponsor of terrorism?

22 A. Yes.

Page 16

1 Q. Do you remember when that was?

2 A. Do I remember what that was or when?

3 Q. When?

4 A. I'm sorry, I don't remember when that
5 was.

6 Q. Well, I have a report that you wrote
7 dated May 11, 2004. Does that help you a little
8 bit?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. So when did I come to see you?

11 A. Probably two months before or something
12 like that.

13 Q. Did you conduct a study and reach an
14 opinion based upon a study that you conducted as
15 to the cause of the bombing of the Cole and
16 whether or not it was state sponsored and whose
17 direct efforts were involved in the Cole?

18 A. Well, we're very methodical, and I can
19 assure you -- in fact, now I remember that I
20 didn't offer an opinion when you came to see me,
21 because I don't speculate. We only investigate
22 and then we form our conclusions. We're not into

Page 17

1 forming preconclusions.

2 Then our conclusion was that the Sudan
3 was a state sponsor of terrorism, and that it was
4 a prime supporter of Al Qaeda in assisting it to
5 carry out the attack on the Cole.

6 Q. In that regard, sir, would you tell me
7 exactly what you did in your investigation in
8 order to reach that opinion.

9 A. Well, we researched extensively Al
10 Qaeda's role in the Sudan for years prior to the
11 attack on the Cole, and we researched the role of
12 the Sudanese in terms of their assistance to Al
13 Qaeda.

14 Q. There are a lot of people who believe
15 that when Osama bin Laden left Sudan on a
16 full-time basis in May of 1996, that that
17 terminated the relationship between Sudan and Al
18 Qaeda. Was that true, sir?

19 A. You know what? Interesting enough, I had
20 thought so. But when our researchers began
21 investigating, they discovered it was not true.
22 In fact, there were continued investments,

Page 18

1 assistance training and provision of military
2 explosives to the Sudanese throughout the period
3 past 2000.

4 Q. In that regard, I want to call your
5 attention to a footnote of the 9/11 Report that's
6 located on page 480, and I'll just read it to you
7 for expediency.

8 Referring to the activities are Osama bin
9 Laden left, it says essentially, "The CIA official
10 read the Sudanese portfolio, met with the Sudanese
11 on numerous occasions and told us the Sudanese
12 were not going to deliver, and the perceived
13 moderates were just flat-out lying."

14 It goes on to say that, "Offers were
15 passed and dismissed by the National Security
16 Council because it believed Sudan is all talk and
17 little action, and that U.S. officials feared
18 Sudan would exploit positive American responses
19 for their own political purposes."

20 In that regard, sir, did you reach the
21 same conclusion yourself?

22 A. This was about delivering bin Laden, I

Page 19

1 presume.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. Yes, I felt that it was all B.S. That
4 they had no intention whatsoever. They lied
5 through their teeth. That this was typical of the
6 Muslim Brotherhood regime that dominated the
7 Sudanese regime.

8 Q. So let me take you to the beginning. Did
9 you come to identify exactly how Al Qaeda came to
10 have a presence in Sudan?

11 A. I don't recall the actual date that Al
12 Qaeda cemented its ties or originated its ties. I
13 think it went back to 1991 when it moved there,
14 and when Al Qaeda was actually formed.

15 Al Qaeda was actually formed -- the base
16 was formed in 1989, but I don't think it expanded
17 its operations much until 1991. I think at that
18 point it established a relationship with Sudan.

19 Q. Are you familiar with the relationship
20 between Omar al Bashir and Hassan al Turabi on the
21 one hand and Al Qaeda on the other?

22 A. Yes, I am.

Page 20

1 Q. Tell us who Bashir and Turabi were.

2 A. Well, Turabi became head of the Muslim
3 Brotherhood, was a fierce ideologue and was also
4 head of the Sudan. Al Bashir was also head of the
5 Sudan. My memory is a little bit shaky here in
6 terms of chronology.

7 Q. Let me see if I can help you with the
8 date. We have independently identified at least
9 two men as coming into power as a result of a coup
10 d'etat in 1989. Does that help you?

11 A. Yes, yes. What I was trying to think of
12 is when one left power and the other one assumed
13 it exclusively. That's what I was trying to think
14 of.

15 Q. Well, let's talk about the types of
16 support Sudan gave. First of all, are you
17 familiar with the annual meetings that occurred in
18 Sudan every year?

19 A. The Popular Front meetings. These are
20 these meetings that Turabi held every year
21 featuring the top radical Islamic leaders from all
22 over, including bin Laden, that were

Page 21

1 extraordinary.

2 Q. Why do you say they're extraordinary?

3 A. Because they were sort of like the annual
4 mafia meetings, gathering the top mob leaders.
5 You know, to gather them in one place, they all
6 talked about jihad. They called for jihad. You
7 know, as a researcher and investigator, I would
8 love to have been a fly on the wall.

9 Q. Now, did these meetings facilitate the
10 planning of the Cole in any way in your opinion?

11 A. I believe there's a great likelihood that
12 they facilitated the planning of the Cole as well
13 as the planning of other attacks. This is the
14 modus operandi of these Islamists.

15 Q. What do you mean by that?

16 A. Generally speaking, when these Islamic
17 leaders get together on such a grand basis, they
18 use it as an opportunity to cover themselves for
19 secret plannings of other attacks. I have seen
20 this over and over again, whether it's in the
21 United States or whether it's in Europe or whether
22 it's in Africa.

Page 22

1 Q. Was Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda
2 location important to Sudan because of the money
3 that they would bring to Sudan?

4 A. The Al Qaeda organization brought an
5 incredible amount of investment to the Sudanese.

6 Q. Why was that important to Sudan?

7 A. Sudan was a very poor country. It didn't
8 have the foreign investments. There were
9 embargoes imposed by the West, so to the extent
10 that the Sudanese were able to get bank
11 investments, were able to get construction
12 companies, were able to get roads built, that was
13 very important.

14 Q. And to your knowledge, has that activity
15 ever come to an end?

16 A. To my knowledge, it has not come to an
17 end.

18 Q. Are you familiar with a bank --

19 A. Al Shamal.

20 Q. -- Al Shamal?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is that a Sudanese bank?

Page 23

1 A. Well, it's an Al Qaeda bank operating in
2 the Sudan. The Sudan will claim that it's a
3 Sudanese bank.

4 Q. But you say it's an Al Qaeda bank?

5 A. Absolutely.

6 Q. When you say it's an Al Qaeda bank, what
7 does this bank do for Al Qaeda?

8 A. I'm sure it launders money for it.

9 Q. Was that laundry money important relative
10 to the Cole?

11 A. Well, every terrorist organization needs
12 to launder money. It can't operate on the basis
13 of receipts for purchasing explosives, paying off
14 people, so it needs cash. The way you generate
15 cash is you launder it through illicit
16 transactions, and this was one way of doing it.

17 Q. Now, you're familiar with the freeze
18 assets that were imposed on Al Qaeda in 1999?

19 A. Right.

20 Q. What did Al Qaeda do to finance its
21 operations after that freeze?

22 A. They changed the operational nature of

Page 24

1 the way they did business as a bank. They adopted
2 the Sheria way of doing business at the bank.

3 Q. What does that mean?

4 A. Well, I think they stopped the western
5 process, and they adopted the Islamic process,
6 which would have been ostensibly little record
7 keeping, more of these unofficial loans, which are
8 done on a handshake, and gives rise and latitude
9 for money laundering.

10 Q. You are familiar with the sworn testimony
11 of Jamal al Fadil in the case of United States of
12 America vs. Bin Laden, correct?

13 A. Yes, he was an informer.

14 Q. Right. Did he provide you information in
15 his sworn testimony that you would, as somebody
16 who investigates, rely upon?

17 A. Yes, I would.

18 Q. What did he provide you relative to the
19 use of these banks as a money laundry for Al Qaeda
20 relative to the Cole?

21 A. If I recall correctly, Fadil stated that
22 the bank was used as a conduit for cash for

Page 25

1 himself and for others in the lead up to the Cole
2 to pay for living expenses and for the explosives.
3 I have not reviewed Fadil's testimony in several
4 years, however.

5 Q. Let me take you forward a little bit.

6 Are you familiar with the use of Sudanese
7 diplomatic pouches to transfer explosives into
8 Yemen?

9 A. Yes, I am.

10 Q. Tell me about that.

11 A. Diplomatic pouches are, ostensibly, free
12 of any type of inspection, and Sudan would exploit
13 that through them to transfer explosives around
14 the world, not just from the Sudan into Yemen.
15 They would use it in the United States for that
16 matter.

17 Q. Specifically, where we noted the Cole
18 bombing occurred in the report of Aden in Yemen --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. -- with explosives that Al Qaeda got,
21 from your experience and your opinion, do you have
22 an opinion as to where the source of those

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1 essentially, it was an island of freedom for
2 terrorists where they could go to and not be
3 caught or arrested.

4 Q. During what period of time were those
5 safe houses provided?

6 A. From at least the time that Bashir and
7 Turabi took over.

8 Q. Until?

9 A. Until probably the new leader took over.

10 Q. Which would be which year?

11 A. That was relatively recently.

12 Q. 2000 --

13 A. 2005?

14 Q. Let's talk about another issue. That's
15 shipping commodities -- gold and conflict gems --
16 into Sudan in order to finance Al Qaeda. Are you
17 familiar with that?

18 A. Not as much. I'm familiar with the work
19 of Douglas Farrah, who I think pioneered the
20 investigation into those, but I'm not a specialist
21 in this area.

22 Q. Okay. So we'll leave that for

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1 explosives would have been?

2 A. I have no doubt the source came from Al
3 Qaeda and was transported to Yemen from Al Qaeda
4 or by the Sudanese government through most
5 probably the diplomatic pouch.

6 Q. Now, safe houses -- are they important to
7 terrorism?

8 A. Essential to terrorism.

9 Q. Why?

10 A. You need a vehicle and a venue where
11 terrorists can hang out without being detected in
12 the months or even years prior to the attack, as
13 reconnaissance is being done, as planning is being
14 done. It's absolutely critical.

15 Q. Did Sudan provide safe houses for Al
16 Qaeda?

17 A. Absolutely. It provides sanctuary and
18 safe houses.

19 Q. What do you mean by "sanctuary"?

20 A. Well, they need a place where they're not
21 going to get arrested or bombed or interdicted, so
22 Sudan protected them. It was a large --

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1 Mr. Farrah.

2 How about the issuance of diplomatic
3 passports to Al Qaeda members starting in 1998?
4 You're familiar with that, aren't you?

5 A. I'm familiar with the use of diplomatic
6 passports by terrorist regimes who in turn
7 transferred them to Al Qaeda.

8 Q. Were those diplomatic passports from
9 Sudan?

10 A. Sudan was one of the regimes that with
11 Iran actually helped mock up the diplomatic
12 passports with the pictures of Al Qaeda members
13 and passed them off as genuine diplomatic
14 passports.

15 Q. We know that in 1998 there was a
16 relationship between Sudan and its use of
17 embassies and Al Qaeda. Would you tell me about
18 that, please?

19 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the question?

20 Q. Let me invite you to paragraph 40 of a
21 document -- take a moment to look at that, please.

22 MR. HALL: Let's go off the record for a

Page 29

1 second, please.

2 (Pause in the proceedings.)

3 BY MR. HALL:

4 Q. Mr. Emerson, there's a document which is
5 called Text: State Department Issues Fact Sheet
6 on Bin Laden, dated August 14, 1996. Did you
7 provide this to me?

8 A. Yes, I believe we did.

9 Q. Take a look at that.

10 A. (Reviewing document.) Yes.

11 Q. And where did you obtain that from, sir?

12 A. From the State Department.

13 Q. That's the United States Department of
14 State?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. All right. In that regards there's a
17 good deal of information on Al Qaeda through the
18 date of the document.

19 A. That was the first time the State
20 Department had issued anything on Al Qaeda.

21 Q. Now, I want to take you back to 1998. Do
22 you recall an agreement between the Sudanese, the

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1 York, Rome, Karachi and Mogadishu.

2 "It was also agreed at the meeting to
3 open Sudan's doors to international Islamic fund
4 raising organizations and to facilitate the
5 movement of extremists by providing them with
6 Sudanese diplomatic passports." You're familiar
7 with that?

8 A. Yes, I am.

9 Q. And tell me exactly what is the
10 significance of that.

11 A. That would be, on a scale of 1 to 10 of
12 importance of a terrorist development, a
13 number 10, 10 being the most important.

14 That would provide terrorists with the
15 absolute perfect cover -- a diplomatic cover -- to
16 carry out terrorist attacks. To travel around the
17 world with the protection of diplomatic passports,
18 with the ability to use diplomatic pouches, with
19 the ability to use diplomatic funds.

20 It would be absolutely critical for the
21 success of an operation, and it is considered the
22 prime vehicle for a terrorist to exploit and the

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1 Yemenese organization and Al Qaeda relative to
2 budget and the use of embassies and diplomatic
3 passports?

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. What do you understand that to mean?

6 A. There was an agreement made to allow the
7 use of Sudanese embassies in various cities around
8 the world to be used by terrorists, as well as
9 financial institutions controlled by the Sudanese
10 also to be used by terrorists.

11 Q. I want to read you a particular sentence
12 from a Canadian intelligence report that we
13 obtained from you which was filed in the Federal
14 Court of Canada in relation to Mohammed Mashoud --
15 is it?

16 A. I think it's Mashoud.

17 Q. Let me read it to you. "A 1998 agreement
18 between Al-Zawahiri and leaders of the Sudanese,
19 Iranian, Ugandan, Yemeni and Egyptian groups
20 established budgets for financing international
21 terrorist organizations and plans to mobilize
22 officials in Sudan's embassies in London, New

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1 prime desire of a terrorist to acquire.

2 Q. And in that regard, sir, do you recall
3 the name of the Al Qaeda operative who was the
4 planner of the Cole bombing? I've got the name
5 here, but I want to see if you can recall it -- al
6 Harethi? Did I mispronounce it? Let me show you.

7 A. (Reviewing document.)

8 Q. How do I pronounce that name?

9 A. Al-Harethi -- Qaed Salim Sinan
10 al-Harethi -- now I'm recalling it, al-Harethi.

11 Q. You recall he lost his life during a CIA
12 attack?

13 A. Right.

14 Q. And do you recall what his role was in
15 the Cole?

16 A. What his goal was?

17 Q. Role.

18 A. Role?

19 Q. If you need to refresh your recollection
20 and look at your papers, we'll go off the record
21 for a second.

22 (Pause in the proceedings.)

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BY MR. HALL:

Q. Have you been able to locate this man's name in your research papers?

A. I remember now -- I had not remembered the name, but now I recall al-Harethi. I remember that bin Laden had worked with another guy in planning the operation.

Q. And this is al-Harethi?

A. That's exactly true.

Q. Where was he trained?

A. He was trained in the Sudan.

Q. At Al Qaeda training bases in the Sudan?

A. Throughout the Sudan.

Q. Does Al Qaeda maintain training bases in the Sudan to train --

A. Does it do it today in 2007?

Q. No. Did it do it from, you know, 1991 on through the bombing of the Cole?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Is that important?

A. Again, the ability to have the safety and sanctuary of a country is vital, and the ability

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to train someplace without worrying about either being bombed or interdicted or arrested is critical.

Q. Sir, without the training camps, safe houses, use of diplomatic passports, the shipment of explosives, the use of money laundering and businesses, and all the other Sudanese support of Al Qaeda, could the Cole have been bombed in Yemen?

A. No, you would have deprived them of the oxygen needed to operate.

MR. HALL: Thank you. That's all I have.

(Reading and signature waived.)

(Whereupon, the proceedings at 2:56 p.m. were concluded.)

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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, to wit:

I, Paula L. Lowery, before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the within-named witness personally appeared before me at the time and place herein set out, and after having been duly sworn by me, according to law, was examined by counsel.

I further certify that the examination was recorded stenographically by me and this transcript is a true record of the proceedings.

I further certify that I am not of counsel to any party, nor an employee of counsel, nor related to any party, nor in any way interested in the outcome of this action.

As witness my hand and notarial seal this

_____ day of _____, 2007.

Paula L. Lowery

Notary Public

My Commission expires:

May 31, 2007

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
NORFOLK DIVISION

OLIVIA RUX, et al,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 204 CV 42

REPUBLIC OF SUDAN,
Defendants.

----- /

CCPY

The deposition of DOUGLAS CHARLES FARAH,
taken by the Plaintiffs, at 1428 Brickell Avenue,
Suite 800, Miami, Florida, February 5th, 2007, at
11:58 a.m., pursuant to notice.

APPEARANCES;

ANDREW HALL, Esq.
Hall, Lamb & Hall
1428 Brickell Avenue
Suite 800
Miami, Florida.

Donald N. Leavell, RPR

U.S. Legal Support
(305) 373-8404

EXHIBIT

B

tabbies

1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is the
2 videotaped deposition of Douglas Farah taken by
3 attorney Andrew Hall in the matter of Olivia Rux et
4 al versus The Republic of Sudan in The United
5 States District Court Eastern District of Virginia,
6 Norfolk Division. The civil action number is 204
7 CV 428. This deposition is taking place at 1428
8 Brickell Avenue, Suite 800, Miami, Florida.

9 Today's date is February 5th, 2007. The time on
10 the video monitor is 11:58 a.m. Would counsel
11 please state their appearances for the record?

12 MR. HALL: My name is Andrew Hall. I
13 appear for the plaintiffs in this matter. There is
14 no one from the firm of Hunter and Williams
15 representing the Republic of Sudan. The Republic
16 of Sudan has sent the Court a letter indicating
17 that it declines to proceed, to participate in
18 these proceedings. Notwithstanding that fact, this
19 deposition was duly noticed in accordance with the
20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for today, at this
21 location, Miami, Florida, for Monday, February 5,
22 2007. And with that, we'll begin.

23 Would you swear the witness, please?
24 Thereupon,

25 DOUGLAS CHARLES FARAH

1 having been first duly sworn, was examined and
2 testified as follows:

3 DIRECT EXAMINATION

4 BY MR. HALL:

5 A. Please state your name, sir.

6 A. Douglas Charles Farah.

7 Q. Mr. Farah, would you give me your
8 business address?

9 A. 7304 Carol Avenue, number 101, Tacoma
10 Park, Maryland, 20912.

11 Q. Let's go through your background, sir.
12 What is your educational background?

13 A. I have a BS in journalism and a BA in
14 Latin American Studies from the University of
15 Kansas in 1985 with highest honors in both degrees.

16 Q. Following your graduation from college
17 did you become active in the investigation and
18 analysis of terrorism?

19 A. I did. As I covered a series of wars
20 and conflicts in Central America and then began
21 investigating drug related terrorism and then
22 eventually in the post 9-11 era, moved on to
23 Islamist terrorism.

24 Q. When you say you began, tell us about
25 your work background, please, sir.

1 A. I worked as a freelance journalist and
2 then as a bureau chief for the Washington Post in
3 Central America in --

4 Q. From what years to what years?

5 A. I began on staff with the Washington
6 Post in 1988. I became the investigative,
7 international investigative correspondent for the
8 Washington Post in 1997, and in 2000 I became the
9 West Africa bureau chief for the Washington Post
10 until I left at the end of 2001.

11 Q. And in that regard, sir, have as you
12 also become a senior fellow for any organization
13 regarding the study intelligence?

14 A. I did. I took a leave of absence from
15 the Washington Post while writing a book and I was
16 then hired as a senior fellow for the National
17 Strategy Information Center and The Consortium for
18 the Study of Intelligence looking at intelligence
19 reform and how intelligence agencies work together,
20 information on terrorist organizations.

21 Q. Did you also consult with the Fletcher
22 School of War and Strategy at Tufts University?

23 A. I have spoken to, with, at Tufts on
24 several occasions, and one of the directors of The
25 Consortium for the Study of Intelligence is the

1 Director of the Fletcher School.

2 Q. Did you publish any papers for that
3 school?

4 A. I published with Richard Schultz, the
5 director of the Fletcher School, a paper that was
6 published by the United States Air Force on
7 insurgencies in armed groups and failed states.

8 Q. What other organizations have you been
9 a consultant for with regard to the issues of
10 terrorism?

11 A. I was, served as a consultant for the
12 Criminal Investigative Unit of United Nations in
13 Bosnia based in Sarajevo. I have dealt with, as a
14 consultant with a European government on terror
15 finance and how money moves. And I currently work
16 with International Assessment and Strategy Center
17 under a contract that's partly funded by the
18 Department of Homeland Security in the United
19 States also looking at terrorism issues.

20 Q. Have you been asked to provide
21 testimony before the United States Congress with
22 regard to terrorism and the movement of money?

23 A. I have testified two times before the
24 United States Congress on the issues of terror
25 finance.

1 Q. Have you ever spoken to the United
2 States military as a featured speaker and expert in
3 the area of terrorism?

4 A. I have been invited to speak to the
5 European command based in Germany on terrorism
6 related issues specifically in Africa. I have
7 addressed the special operations forces in Tampa,
8 Florida. I have addressed West Point classes on
9 counter-insurgency and terrorism and numerous other
10 military academies that have asked me to come in
11 and speak to them.

12 Q. Among those academies did you ever
13 address the Center for Army Analysis?

14 A. I did. That was one of the people
15 that brought me in to give a class on terrorist
16 finance and how terrorism, terrorists like to use
17 commodities to maintain financial value.

18 Q. Have you ever had occasion to give a
19 lecture at the United States Army War College?

20 A. I have. And I have lectured there on
21 the same basic topic, yes.

22 Q. Now, have you ever had a chance, an
23 opportunity to lecture or speak at any American
24 institutions, specifically Yale?

25 A. I have spoken at Yale University; I

1 have spoken at Tufts University; I have spoken at
2 the University of Florida; and many other
3 educational institutions.

4 Q. I'm tempted to say "Go Gators." But I
5 suspect we need to be a little more serious than
6 that today.

7 Did you ever have occasion to speak
8 before any formal policy groups like the Brookings
9 Institute or anything like that?

10 A. I have spoken to the Brookings
11 Institution on numerous occasions. I'm part of a
12 working group on failed states that meets regularly
13 there both to present and to hear other presenters
14 on the topic. I have participated as an expert in
15 the Princeton Project which was a gathering of
16 knowledgeable people on terrorism and future
17 threats that provided an extensive analysis of the
18 over-the-horizon threats for the public and for the
19 US Government that was published late last year. I
20 have served on the Failed States and Armed Group
21 Committee of that project. And, so, yes.

22 Q. How about The American Enterprise
23 Institute?

24 A. I have spoken to the American
25 Enterprise Institute also on the issue of terror

1 financing in Africa.

2 Q. Woodrow Wilson International,
3 International Center for scholars?

4 A. Yes, I have.

5 Q. What was your relationship with that
6 group?

7 A. It was an invitation to speak again on
8 terror finance issues.

9 Q. What is the NEFA?

10 A. That's the 9-11 Finding Answers
11 Foundation. It's a group I consult with. It is a
12 foundation that is dedicated to looking at terror
13 finance and how it works and I am an investigator
14 with them on contract.

15 Q. And what -- are you employed by IBI
16 Consultants at this time?

17 A. IBI Consultants is my company, yes.

18 Q. And do you write regularly on the
19 subject of terrorism?

20 A. I do. Primarily for the International
21 Assessment and Strategy Center which is a private
22 foundation also looking at terrorism issues. I
23 generally write at least once a month. I also
24 recently published in the New Republic Magazine, in
25 Foreign Policy Magazine, the Washington Post

1 Outlook section.

2 Q. Have you written any books on the
3 subject of terrorism or funding of terrorism?

4 A. I wrote a book that was published in
5 May of 2004 by Broadway Books in New York called
6 Blood From Stones, The Secret Financial Network of
7 Terror which deals extensively and primarily with
8 terrorist funding, yes.

9 Q. Did you write -- do you have another
10 book in progress right now?

11 A. I have another book that is completed
12 and now in the printing process, to be released in
13 August, called The Merchants of Death. It's the
14 story of Victor Boot and the illicit arms movements
15 around the world to terrorist organizations.

16 Q. Have you written chapters of books as
17 well?

18 A. I have written chapters for several
19 books, one which will be published also this year
20 by Brown University, on the relationship between
21 commodities and terror finance. I have written a
22 chapter for a book on Latin American Insurgencies
23 that came out, I believe, in 1998, and I think
24 that's, I think that's it.

25 Q. And what magazines have you published

1 in?

2 A. I have published in Foreign Policy
3 Magazine; I have published in Russie which is a
4 respected great, publication in Great Britain
5 dealing with intelligence and terrorism issues.

6 Q. Is that the Royal United Services
7 Institute?

8 A. Yes, it is. I have published in the
9 Washington Post Magazine. I have published in
10 Mother Jones Magazine. I have published in --

11 Q. What is Mother Jones magazine?

12 A. It's a liberal magazine, advocacy
13 magazine that's been around for about a hundred
14 years. I have published for several European
15 publications as well, Anjou International
16 (Phonetic) from Belgium. I have had pieces in the
17 Financial Times, ed piece, not a magazine piece,
18 and other publications.

19 Q. Now, sir, in this case, do you recall
20 my contacting you to ask you to consult and to
21 provide expert testimony regarding the role of
22 Sudan in connection with the bombing of the United
23 States Cole?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. Do you recall how long ago that was?

1 A. That was in 2006, I would guess the
2 middle of 2006.

3 Q. Now, with regard to the issue of Sudan
4 and its role in, as an active state sponsor of
5 terrorism, are you familiar with that at all?

6 A. I have come across the role and
7 studied the role of Sudan and, in extensive, in
8 various cases, yes.

9 Q. Let's talk about that role. Do you
10 have an opinion as to what role Sudan played with
11 regard to the sponsoring of terrorist activities?

12 A. I think Sudan provided a fundamental
13 role in the early 1990s, particularly when the
14 groups of Islamic radicals were beginning to form
15 into viable armed groups when Hassan Al Turabi who
16 was the leader of the National Arabic Front invited
17 all of the Arab fighters to come into Sudan without
18 visa requirements, without having to go through
19 customs to be checked. And that was a fundamental
20 moment in the allowing these groups to shape
21 themselves into coherent military units.

22 Q. Now, when you say, now Mr. Turabi, was
23 he an official of the government of Sudan?

24 A. Yes, he was. He was the leader of the
25 National Islamic Front which was the party that

1 through a coup became power in Sudan.

2 Q. Was he the head of government in
3 Sudan?

4 A. He was. And he also was
5 simultaneously the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood
6 which is an over-arching branch of Islamists and he
7 provided the infrastructure both on behalf of Sudan
8 and on behalf of the Brotherhood to give a base for
9 these groups to form and a financial center from
10 which they could operate.

11 Q. Now, you started with the idea of
12 inviting the terrorists to come to Sudan. Are they
13 still invited to be in Sudan?

14 A. Sudan has gone to great lengths to
15 distance itself from terrorism. But I think it's
16 an artificial distancing. There are current
17 reports from United Nations and elsewhere, there
18 are still Islamist training camps in Sudan and they
19 clearly have not severed their links as you can
20 see, given the preponderance of the Islamist
21 radicals that are carrying out the Darfur massacres.
22 They have clearly not distanced themselves from
23 the terrorist infrastructure.

24 Q. Have you studied the relationship of
25 the Sudan Support of Al-Qaeda and the bombing of

1 the Cole?

2 A. I have looked at that, yes.

3 Q. Why don't you tell us historically
4 about how that support involved into a major
5 meaningful role toward the bombings of the Cole.
6 Can you do that, sir?

7 A. In my experience in dealings with 20
8 years of armed groups and terrorist groups, they
9 always need a physical structure from which they
10 can operate. And particularly terrorist
11 organizations need a place from which they can come
12 and go, where they or their friends control the
13 entry and exit points of that country to guarantee
14 that they will not be impeded in their movements.
15 Sudan provided that beginning in 1992.

16 Q. Are you talking about a, but are you
17 talking about a safe place to work from?

18 A. I'm talking about a safe place, a safe
19 haven under government protection where they can be
20 guaranteed that other people will not come looking
21 for them. And Sudan provided that beginning in
22 1991, '92 to Osama Bin Laden and continued to
23 provide that same service after he left in 1996.
24 But I think in looking at how terrorist
25 organizations work, that's a primary requirement.

1 And without Sudan allowing those groups to form
2 into a cohesive infrastructure in Sudan and be able
3 to move elsewhere with impunity, including across
4 the fairly open border into Yemen, it would have
5 been very difficult for them to put together the
6 infrastructure that could carry out the Cole
7 attack.

8 Q. But we know that actually Sudan got
9 closer and did more over time, did it not?

10 A. Did more in what sense, sir?

11 Q. In, in, more in terms of Al-Qaeda and
12 supporting Al-Qaeda, and the Cole?

13 A. Well, what made Sudan unusual, I
14 wouldn't say unique because Afghanistan also played
15 the same role, is it provided them with a central
16 government protection which is an unusually
17 valuable commodity if you're an armed group,
18 especially if you're a terrorist group. That
19 states's protection of their infrastructure allowed
20 them to acquire property, acquire businesses,
21 launder money through those properties, obtain
22 diplomatic passports which allowed them to move
23 around the world with impunity and unable to be
24 searched and it also provided them fundamentally
25 with a banking structure, Islamic structure that's

1 out of the norm of the banking rules that we're
2 acquainted with in the west and allowed them
3 channels to move money through that would be
4 virtually undiscoverable to the outside world.

5 Q. Let's just go through the passage of
6 time. Did Al-Qaeda acquire financial interest in
7 business in Sudan which allowed Al-Qaeda to launder
8 money through these Sudanese businesses?

9 A. Yes, we know that they acquired a
10 tannery, they acquired agricultural businesses,
11 they acquired a number of farms, they had a virtual
12 corner on the gum Arabic market which is used in a
13 variety of sodas and things like that. So they
14 were able to put together a fairly large
15 infrastructure. And they also invested, Bin Laden
16 personally invested tens of millions of dollars in
17 this, a particular bank, in the Al Shamal bank.

18 Q. Do you recall the precise amount?

19 A. 50 million dollars is what the State
20 Department has said and what other people have told
21 me as well, out of his personal inheritance, that
22 that was his, that was the last chunk of his family
23 money and he put it into a bank which gave him
24 partial ownership of the bank and a way to set up
25 accounts and move money that were completely off

1 the books for anyone else looking for it. And
2 that's an incredibly important asset when you're
3 looking at funding armed groups and you don't want
4 people to determine whether the money comes from.

5 Q. Are you able, sir, to have something,
6 for example, if you have a sleeper cell in Yemen,
7 like the bombers of the Cole were a sleeper cell in
8 Yemen for Al-Qaeda, is it necessary for you to be
9 able to have money off the books to fund them so
10 they can be a sleeper cell?

11 A. Absolutely. They can't do anything
12 without money and can't do anything without
13 training. And Sudan provided the financial
14 infrastructure and the training infrastructure for,
15 for the people involved in that attack.

16 Q. Now, let me just go forward in time.
17 We have heard that somewhere in 1996, the
18 leadership of Sudan expelled Osama Bin Laden. Did
19 Sudan at the same time terminate its relationship
20 as a state sponsor of Al-Qaeda?

21 A. No, it did not. Al-Qaeda remained,
22 retained its business interest there. On the books
23 it appears as though those businesses lost
24 significant amounts of money. They don't look like
25 good investments. He also had to pay into the

1 National Islamic Front structure so they could make
2 money off of his being there. But in reality a lot
3 of the losses appeared to me from what I have seen
4 to be money laundering losses, not actual losses.
5 There are ways of moving money through a cycle so
6 that it simply will disappear. And the businesses,
7 those businesses stayed intact well into this
8 century, years after.

9 Q. Well, well into the year 2000?

10 A. Well into, well after the year 2000,
11 yes.

12 Q. Do you recall where Sudan actually
13 started issuing official documents to members of
14 Al-Qaeda so that they could conduct their terrorist
15 activities, specifically passports?

16 A. I have been -- from what I know, they
17 began at least in 1998 and probably before to issue
18 diplomatic passports and order their Embassies
19 around the world to assist Al-Qaeda in whatever way
20 necessary. So they were able, and that's a very
21 important point because diplomatic passports and
22 diplomatic protection means you can't be searched
23 and questioned as you go across borders. And
24 that's something the terrorists have always wanted
25 and sought to acquire, and almost anywhere. And

1 Sudan gave it to them on a silver platter.

2 Q. You're aware, are you not, that after
3 these diplomatic facilities were being offered to
4 Al-Qaeda starting in 1998, that those same pouches,
5 diplomatic pouches were used to ship at least one
6 shipment of explosives into Yemen?

7 A. Yes, they were used to ship at least
8 one bag of explosives or pouch of explosives into
9 Yemen, which again I say is incredibly important.
10 Without a state sponsor you can't do that, because
11 diplomatic passport -- pouches are not searched.
12 And so you can do numerous things through
13 diplomatic channels that would be much more
14 difficult to do otherwise.

15 Q. Now, we know from various official
16 accounts that in January of 2000 there was an
17 effort in Yemen by Al-Qaeda to sink the United
18 States ship The Sullivans which failed when the
19 boat filled with explosives sunk, and then
20 ultimately the second effort was on the Cole also
21 with explosives. Where would those explosives come
22 from based on your knowledge and experience in this
23 area?

24 A. They can't appear from nowhere and
25 they can't travel across borders that aren't secure

1 for the people who are moving them. So I would --
2 my best guess would be they would have to come from
3 Sudan which was the closest place to Yemen in which
4 they had the safe quarter in which to be able to
5 move this type of goods across the border.

6 Q. When you say your best guess, are you
7 talking about your studied opinion, or are you
8 guessing?

9 A. I'm talking about my studied opinion
10 and having discussed this case with intelligence
11 officials who believe the same this I do.

12 Q. Intelligence officials of which
13 nations?

14 A. United States and Europe.

15 Q. Now, sir, do you recall that there
16 came a point in time where the government of the
17 United States started freezing assets --

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. -- of Al-Qaeda? Do you recall when
20 that was?

21 A. They, the main freeze came following
22 the August, 1998, bombings of the US Embassies in
23 East Africa. It was an attempt to, and according
24 to the officials involved in actually doing the
25 freeze, it was a wild attempt to take some

1 retaliatory action against Al-Qaeda without
2 realizing, that in fact, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
3 had money in the United States banking system.

4 Q. Now, sir, do you recall the
5 administration in its retaliatory action directed a
6 cruise missile strike against Sudan?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. And that would be 1998?

9 A. That would be 1998, yes, sir.

10 Q. Now, following that missile strike and
11 the freeze of assets, did something else happen
12 with regard to the movement of money and/or things
13 that could be used to buy munitions and support?

14 A. Well, what happened was that the
15 United States effort to freeze the assets of
16 terrorists led to the freezing of 220 million
17 dollars in gold that was in the US Federal Reserve
18 system, something that a part of which belonged to
19 Bin Laden and a part of which belonged to the
20 Taliban in Afghanistan. And following that the
21 Al-Qaeda members decided to move all of their
22 assets that they could out of the formal banking
23 structure and into commodities that could be moved
24 easily across borders and would be very difficult
25 to trace.

1 Q. And you personally became involved in
2 uncovering that, did you not?

3 A. I did in the weeks after the 9-11
4 attack in 2001, I was told by people directly
5 involved in the trade that, in fact, Al-Qaeda, had
6 been buying a large sum of diamonds in Liberia and
7 Sierra Leone, profiting from those particularly
8 ugly wars in those two countries that were
9 essentially one conflict spilling over into two
10 different countries. And it was, Al-Qaeda was
11 buying up the Alluvial diamond harvest in 2001 in
12 order to move its money into commodities and out of
13 banking.

14 Q. Now, did you, were you in Sierra Leone
15 at the time you made that discovery?

16 A. Yes, I was. I traveled extensively to
17 Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana and elsewhere on the
18 story, but I was in Sierra Leone, yes, sir.

19 Q. And did you identify the actual
20 Al-Qaeda operatives that were engaged in the
21 purchase of these gems?

22 A. I did.

23 Q. And how did you identify them as
24 Al-Qaeda operatives?

25 A. Initially through an eyewitness who

1 had dealt with them directly on the diamonds who
2 had carried -- who had driven them into the bush
3 from Liberia into Sierra Leone to purchase
4 diamonds. His account and his identification were
5 backed up by two other people who had also dealt
6 directly with the three Al-Qaeda operatives that I
7 identified in the story I wrote for the Washington
8 Post as being involved in the diamond trade on
9 behalf of Al-Qaeda.

10 Q. Were you able once you started that
11 investigation to go backwards and trace in time how
12 Al-Qaeda started moving in commodities, that is to
13 say gold and gems, after its assets were frozen?

14 A. I did. I was not only in Liberia and
15 Sierra Leone but I spent time in Pakistan and the
16 United Arab Emirates also to people who dealt
17 directly with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who told
18 me, explained to me the rationale for their moving
19 into diamonds and why it had happened. And further
20 investigations as it went along began to gather
21 documents that were coming out and being
22 translated, we have declarations by Osama Bin
23 Laden's body guards while he's in the Sudan talking
24 about the need to aid the Liberian conflict. He
25 viewed it, according to the document that, that was

1 published by a newspaper account of an extensive
2 interview with one of Bin Laden's body guards that
3 in fact, he was very Bin Laden, himself, was very
4 concerned while in the Sudan. And there's another
5 man named Mamoun Darkanzali in his trial in Germany
6 also was asked what he was -- if he knew Bin Laden.
7 He said yes, he knew Bin Laden and he was involved
8 in the gem stone trade with Bin Laden while Bin
9 Laden was in the Sudan. So my conclusion from
10 those and other documents is that the movement into
11 commodities actually began probably somewhat before
12 '98 and accelerated in '98 but was directed by Bin
13 Laden while he was in the Sudan.

14 Q. Over time, did you discover the
15 movement of those commodities into Sudan?

16 A. What I discovered in 2002 was that a
17 very high level European intelligence task force
18 had become aware of gold, of flights of gold mixed
19 with other commodities that were flying out of
20 Afghanistan and Pakistan into Sudan, yes, and Sudan
21 was still a harbor where they felt safe, where they
22 could take their money to, as the Taliban fell and
23 Al-Qaeda fled Afghanistan following the US
24 occupation of Afghanistan. They were flying gold
25 bars out in shipments in Russian aircraft to Sudan

1 which clearly indicated to the intelligence
2 analysts looking at this that Sudan was still a
3 safe haven for them.

4 Q. Did you go back and trace those
5 shipments to periods of time in 1998, 1999, and
6 2000?

7 A. The shipments of what, sir?

8 Q. Gold.

9 A. The shipments of gold, I only became
10 aware of in the 2002 time period, that were going
11 back in that, at that time.

12 Q. Now, let's go back to Sudan and the
13 banking structure. You made the comment that this
14 particular bank was, in Sudan, played an important
15 role because it was unlike western banks. Can you
16 explain that?

17 A. Beginning in 1981, 1982, there was a
18 concerted move to establish a separate Islamic
19 banking structure that would be separate from the
20 western banking structure. In the extensive
21 literature that the Islamists wrote about this as
22 they did it which I, which I have reviewed
23 extensively and written about, they decided that
24 they wanted a whole system where they could operate
25 under Sharia law or Islamic law where you don't

1 collect interest and other different, things,
2 things are different from the western banking
3 system.

4 What developed in reality since then were a
5 series of very difficult to trace financial
6 institutions where ownership overlaps among a small
7 group of people and a small number of banks, and
8 where the way the bookkeeping is done and the way
9 the secrecy that surrounds these banks makes it
10 virtually impossible to understand how transactions
11 actually transpire in there. And numerous of these
12 banks have been, come under investigation in
13 terrorist finance cases including the Al Shamal
14 bank in which Mr. Bin Laden invested his, his 50
15 million dollars. And they're particularly
16 attractive because even if you can get into the
17 banking records you can basically not understand
18 them at all unless someone will walk you through
19 that and if someone won't, you're left with a,
20 pretty much a worthless pile of papers and books
21 that are unintelligible to the outside world.

22 Q. Did Sudan allow its banking system and
23 this bank in particular to be used by Al-Qaeda to
24 fund its terrorism and its various sleeper cells
25 and networks?

1 A. As I said, what made Sudan interesting
2 and unique was that it was a centrally directed
3 operation from the central government of Sudan, so
4 they clearly had control over the banking system.
5 It was a very centralized government structure.
6 And so Al-Qaeda could not have used those banks
7 with the impunity, and we have witnesses in trials
8 and talking about their constantly going to Al
9 Shamal banks and other banks to open accounts.
10 They couldn't have operated with that degree of
11 freedom and openness if they had not been
12 sanctioned by the central government to do so.

13 Q. So, let's, and then let's go to a
14 different subject. Terrorist conferences: Does
15 Sudan harbor terrorist conferences including
16 Al-Qaeda at its terrorist conferences?

17 A. Sudan has hosted at least one
18 conference a year for, going back to at least 1995.
19 And what you see, what makes these conferences --

20 Q. Would that be 2000, 2001, 2002?

21 A. 2000, up until my last information was
22 at least 2002, 2005 they were allowing these groups
23 to, to come in.

24 Q. What is the importance of having these
25 conferences relative to the ability to have an

1 event like the bombing of the Cole?

2 A. Well, I think the significance of
3 these conferences is it allows different terrorist
4 groups with different expertise to get together and
5 exchange information, exchange methods of
6 operation, exchange pipelines to different types of
7 goods that all the terrorists needs, for example,
8 false passports, dynamite, explosives, that sort of
9 thing. And I think that to set up a network that
10 can reach across borders, these meetings where
11 you're safe and can sit down and actually talk to
12 people extensively who share your basic etiology,
13 are incredibly important because that is where the
14 networks begin. And those networks then flow out
15 from Sudan into Yemen and elsewhere.

16 Q. Now let's just put that together and
17 see if you have given us a picture, sir. I think
18 you have told us that in your opinion, the bombing
19 of the Cole was, actively was supported by Sudan,
20 is that correct, sir?

21 A. I don't think the bombing of the Cole
22 could have happened without the active support of
23 the government of Sudan.

24 Q. Is there anything else you would like
25 to say about that subject or have we completed your

1 testimony?

2 A. I think that it's important as I said
3 to be aware of the central nature of the Sudanese
4 government in the participation of Al-Qaeda in the
5 Sudan and in the establishment of the networks,
6 both physical and financial that existed there.
7 Al-Qaeda tried in other countries to go in and do
8 similar things and they couldn't, because they
9 didn't have the central government backing.

10 Sudan gave them essentially the breath
11 of life that they needed to become a focused,
12 energetic group that could then move out from there
13 into extensive training with financial backing
14 around the world and leading to not only the Cole
15 but to 9-11.

16 Q. One more thought before we're done.
17 We know that following the expulsion of Osama Bin
18 Laden or the theoretical expulsion of Osama Bin
19 Laden from Sudan, Sudan provided some documents,
20 but not a lot of documents regarding its activities
21 and its support of terrorism. Do you know why it
22 withheld documents?

23 A. I would -- my best -- to the best of
24 my knowledge it would be because the documents
25 would be incriminating to them at a very senior

1 level and would demonstrate their state sponsorship
2 of terrorism.

3 My understanding from dealing with
4 people who dealt with Sudan in that particular case
5 was that most of the documents they received were
6 the most, were the oldest and least relevant
7 documents, which was an attempt by Sudan not to get
8 punished by the United States for possible
9 involvement also in the 2001 bombing when President
10 Bush said you're either for us or against us; but
11 they withheld the most relevant information because
12 there is no doubt in my mind that it would show the
13 highest levels of government from Hassan Al Turabi
14 down through the NIF structure as directly and
15 knowingly supporting terrorism.

16 Q. So would it be accurate to say that
17 from the original Al Fatwa declaration of war and
18 the statement that US military assets should be
19 attacked which was made in Sudan by Osama Bin Laden
20 in 1992, directly through the attack on the Cole,
21 there is a continuous and unending support by Sudan
22 of Al-Qaeda which allowed the Cole to, bombing to
23 occur?

24 A. Absolutely. I think that from 1992
25 through the Cole bombing, Sudan provided an

1 incredibly necessary and vital infrastructure for
2 Al-Qaeda to be able to prepare and move the
3 explosives and carry out the attacks on the Cole.
4 And it was not clandestine or hidden presence, but
5 rather fairly overt and knowing presence by senior
6 members of the NIF government in Sudan.

7 MR. HALL: Thank you, sir. That is
8 all I have.

9 THE WITNESS: Well, we're done.
10 (Thereupon, the deposition was
11 concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

STATE OF FLORIDA:

SS.

COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE

I, Donald Leavell, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public for the State of Florida at Large, do hereby certify that I reported the proceedings in the above-styled matter; that the foregoing pages constitute a true and correct transcription of my shorthand notes of the proceedings on this date.

I further certify that I am not attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or employee of any attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor financially interested in the action.

Witness my hand in the City of Miami, County of Miami-Dade, State of Florida, this 18th day of February, 2007.

Registered Professional Reporter
Notary Public, State of Florida at Large
My Commission, #DD188899, Expires 2/27/07

R. James Woolsey

Page 1

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
3 NORFOLK DIVISION

4 -----X

5 OLIVIA RUX., et al., :

6 Plaintiffs : Civil Action No.

7 : 2:04CV428

8 v. :

9 : PAGES 1 through 34

10 THE REPUBLIC OF THE :

11 SUDAN, :

12 Defendant :

13 -----X

14

15 Videotaped Deposition of R. James Woolsey

16 Washington, DC

17 Wednesday, June 22, 2005

18

19

20

21 Reported by: Joanne Liverani, RMR

22 JOB NO. 168034

EXHIBIT

C

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R. James Woolsey

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 2</p> <p>1 2 3 4 June 22, 2005 5 9:34 a.m. 6 7 Videotaped Deposition of R. James Woolsey, held at the 8 offices of: 9 10 Greenberg Traurig LLP 11 800 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest 12 Suite 500 13 Washington, DC 20006 14 15 Pursuant to notice, before Joanne Liverani, RMR, a 16 Notary Public of the District of Columbia. 17 18 19 20 21 22</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 4</p> <p>1 CONTENTS 2 EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS: PAGE 3 Examination By Mr. Hall 6 4 ROBERT JAMES WOOLSEY, JR. 5 6 Woolsey Deposition Exhibits PAGE 7 1 multipage document re The Federal 14 Court of Canada, in relation to 8 Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub 9 2 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, US 30 State Department, April 2001 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 3</p> <p>1 APPEARANCES: 2 For the Plaintiffs, OLIVIA RUX, ET AL. 3 Hall, David & Joseph 4 1428 Brickell Avenue 5 Miami, Florida 33131-9133 6 (305)374-5030 7 BY: Andrew Hall, Esq. 8 9 Also Present: 10 Douglas Farah, Consultant - Analyst 11 Jonathan Perry, Videographer 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 5</p> <p>1 VIDEOGRAPHER: This is tape 2 number one of the videotaped deposition of R. James 3 Woolsey taken in the matter of Rux versus Republic 4 of Sudan. We are at the offices of Greenberg 5 Traurig, 800 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, 6 Washington, DC. Today's date is June 22, 2005. 7 The time on the video screen is currently 9:34 and 8 16 seconds a.m. My name is Jonathan Perry. I am 9 the videographer from Esquire Deposition Services. 10 The court reporter is Joanne Liverani, also from 11 Esquire Deposition Services. 12 Will counsel present please introduce 13 themselves and state whom they represent. 14 MR. HALL: My name is Andrew 15 Hall, I represent the plaintiffs in this matter. 16 By way of beginning, the -- a lawyer, Gregory 17 Stanton, just filed a notice of appearance in this 18 matter last week. Mr. Stanton sent my colleagues 19 and not me a letter requesting that we cancel all 20 depositions that were set, but in light of the 21 court's pending order for final hearing, we aren't 22 able to accommodate that request. I informed</p>

2 (Pages 2 to 5)

R. James Woolsey

<p>Page 6</p> <p>1 Mr. Stanton of that information verbally this past 2 Friday and in letter -- in a letter yesterday, in 3 prompt response to his, we normally wait some more 4 time for him to arrive. He is late. But in light 5 of his letter, and in light of everything else 6 that's going on, and more importantly in light of 7 Mr. Woolsey's very tight schedule, we are unable to 8 accommodate further delay. So let's proceed. 9 VIDEOGRAPHER: Have the reporter 10 swear in the witness, please. 11 Thereupon, 12 ROBERT JAMES WOOLSEY, JR., 13 the Witness, called for examination by counsel for the 14 Plaintiffs, and, after having been sworn by the notary, 15 was examined and testified as follows: 16 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS, OLIVIA RUX, 17 ET AL. 18 BY MR. HALL: 19 Q Please state your full name. 20 A Robert James Woolsey, Jr. 21 Q Mr. Woolsey, what is your business 22 address?</p>	<p>Page 8</p> <p>1 Q Did you distinguish yourself while you 2 were taking your masters at Oxford? 3 A I attended there on a Rhodes 4 Scholarship, got a degree in philosophy, politics, 5 and economics, and then returned to law school. 6 Q Would you tell us what a Rhodes scholar 7 is? 8 A It is a student who is selected, one of 9 about 100 a year, from United States, Germany, and 10 former British Commonwealth, pursuant to a trust 11 established by Cecil Rhodes. Scholarships began 12 around 1903 -- 1904, at the beginning of the 13 twentieth century. It is a competitive scholarship 14 based on academics, and to some extent on service 15 and -- and athletics, depending on the panel that's 16 doing the selecting. 17 There are about 30 -- I think there's 32 18 Americans of the hundred some every year. 19 Q Were you at Oxford when President 20 Clinton was obtaining his time there? 21 A No, no. I did not know President 22 Clinton until he declared for the presidency. He's</p>
<p>Page 7</p> <p>1 A 8283 Goldsboro [sic] Drive, McLean, 2 Virginia. I am a vice president of Booz Allen 3 Hamilton consulting firm. 4 Q And, would you provide me, sir, with 5 your educational background starting with your 6 attendance in public schools? 7 A I attended the public schools of Tulsa, 8 Oklahoma, graduating from Tulsa Central High School 9 in 1959. I received a bachelors of arts degree 10 from Stanford University in 1963; a masters from 11 Oxford University in England, in 1965; and a law 12 degree from Yale University Law School in 1968. 13 Q Would you please, sir, tell us whether 14 or not you distinguished yourself through any 15 awards or honors or achievements at Stanford? 16 A I graduated Phi Beta Kappa with great 17 distinction from Stanford. 18 Q And, what does "great distinction" mean 19 in that system? 20 A It's in the top few percent of 21 graduates, I don't know, I imagine around the top 22 5 percent.</p>	<p>Page 9</p> <p>1 five years younger than I, so he was actually still 2 in high school when I began Oxford. 3 Q Did you distinguish yourself while 4 attending Yale Law School? 5 A I was managing editor of the Yale Law 6 Journal. 7 Q And, could you tell us what that means? 8 A A small percentage of the classes 9 selected usually either by grades or by writing 10 ability to edit the law school's legal publication. 11 At Yale it's called the Yale Law Journal, and I was 12 the managing editor of that journal. 13 Q Could you describe for us your work 14 experience? 15 A In -- as soon as I graduated from law 16 school, I went on active duty in the US Army. I 17 had a ROTC commission. I was assigned to the 18 Pentagon to work on intelligence matters in the 19 Office of the Secretary of Defense. I worked on 20 those matters for about nine months, and then I 21 began working directly for former deputy Secretary 22 of Defense, Paul Nitze, who had returned in March</p>

3 (Pages 6 to 9)

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R. James Woolsey

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10</p> <p>1 of 1969 to head up arms control work for the 2 Pentagon. 3 I accompanied him to Helsinki and Vienna 4 as an adviser on the delegation to the strategic 5 arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. I 6 worked for him until the summer of 1970, when I 7 finished my two years active duty in the Army. 8 I was assigned for a six-month period, 9 agreed to work for a six-month period in the 10 National Security Council Staff, helping on arms 11 control matters. 12 I left right at the end of 1970, to 13 become general counsel of the Senate Armed Services 14 Committee, a post I held for three years, until in 15 late 1973, I moved to Shea and Gardner law firm as 16 an associate. I practiced law there until late 17 1976 when I served on the transition team for the 18 incoming Carter administration. I was asked to 19 serve as under secretary of the Navy, in the Carter 20 administration, and was nominated, confirmed by the 21 Senate, served in that job for three years until 22 late 1979, when I returned to Shea and Gardner, as</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 12</p> <p>1 as Director of Central Intelligence. I served in 2 that position from early February of '93 to early 3 January of '95. Resigned, went to my -- back to my 4 law firm, where I practiced from early '95 until 5 the summer of 2002. My practice in those years at 6 Shea and Gardner was the fields of civil litigation 7 and alternative dispute resolution, particularly 8 arbitrations -- commercial arbitrations. 9 I went in 19 -- summer of 2002, to Booz 10 Allen Hamilton, large international consulting 11 firm, where I work today as a partner and vice 12 president on issues related to counterterrorism, 13 law enforcement, counterintelligence, continuity of 14 government and continuity of operations of 15 government departments. 16 Q If we were to talk about the overall 17 period of time involving government, how much time, 18 how many years have you spent in which the issue of 19 terrorism and counterterrorism, including your 20 current job, has been a focus of your work? 21 A Well, I would say only the two years at 22 the CIA of the full-time government work was</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 11</p> <p>1 a partner. 2 Practiced law at Shea and Gardner 3 through the 1980s, until 1989, for three years 4 during that time, in the mid-1980s, from '83 to '86 5 I was appointed by President Reagan to be 6 delegate-at-large to the Arms Control negotiations 7 with the Soviets in Geneva on nuclear and space 8 weapons. 9 That was a part-time undertaking. I did 10 that on a continual basis for some number of weeks 11 a year. In -- from '83 to '86. 12 In 1989 I was nominated by President 13 Bush, 41, to be the ambassador and negotiator for 14 the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in Vienna. 15 I took over those negotiations in early November of 16 1989. I concluded them successfully, and the 17 treaty was approved by the Senate for ratification 18 in the summer of '91. 19 I returned to my law firm in late 20 summer/early fall of 1991, to Shea and Gardner. I 21 practiced law until early 1993. I was asked by 22 President -- then President-elect Clinton to serve</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 13</p> <p>1 focused in important measure on terrorism and 2 counterterrorism. And then, the years since 2002, 3 the last three years, I have worked on those issues 4 a good deal while at Booz Allen Hamilton. 5 During the '90s, after early '95, until 6 the summer of 2002, I followed these issues 7 principally through the press and through 8 friendships with various people who were working on 9 them and discussing them, but there was an 10 extracurricular matter. 11 Q Are you generally familiar with the 12 attack and resulting deaths of 17 sailors on the 13 USS Cole in October 2000? 14 A Yes. 15 Q How did you become familiar with that 16 event? 17 A Through the press. 18 Q Now, sir, we've asked you to come here 19 to provide your opinion by way of deposition 20 testimony, and you've agreed to do this without 21 subpoena and without compensation; is that correct? 22 A That's correct.</p>

4 (Pages 10 to 13)

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R. James Woolsey

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 14</p> <p>1 Q And we've provided some materials for 2 you to familiarize yourself with, and go over, in 3 anticipation of your deposition, and I would like 4 to go over those with you briefly 5 A Yes. 6 Q Let me hand you first a document that 7 was filed by Canadian Intelligence in the Federal 8 Court trial division in the matter of, quote: A 9 certificate issued pursuant to Section 40.1 of the 10 Immigration Act, and – and the application of 11 Muhammad Zeki Mahjoub, and ask you if that was one 12 of the documents we had provided to you? 13 A Yes. 14 MR. HALL: Let's mark that as Exhibit 1, 15 please. 16 (Woolsey Exhibit No. 1 - multipage document 17 re The Federal Court of Canada, in relation 18 to Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub - was marked for 19 identification.) 20 BY MR. HALL: 21 Q We've also provided to you a book and an 22 opportunity to meet and speak with Douglas Farah</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 16</p> <p>1 training camps are located in Sudan, Bosnia, and 2 Afghanistan. And in Sudan, Bosnia AJ camps are 3 financed by Saudi dissident and terrorist financier 4 Osama Bin Laden. In addition, Al-Zawaheri has met 5 with leaders of Sudanese, Eritrean, Ugandan, Yemeni 6 and Egyptian Islamic groups. In May of 1998, these 7 leaders agreed to build training camps in new areas 8 inside Sudan. One example of training in the 9 United States has been uncovered. 10 That section was provided to you? 11 A That's correct. 12 Q Now, is this the type of report that 13 you, from the Canadian Intelligence authorities, 14 which was filed in an immigration proceeding in a 15 court in Canada, the type of document that you as 16 an expert in terrorism, counterterrorism during 17 your days at the CIA would rely on? 18 A It is an unclassified version of the 19 kind of material that we relied on. Canadian 20 Intelligence, CSIS is a small but – but fine 21 intelligence service, and the cooperation of course 22 between American and Canadian intelligence was very</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 15</p> <p>1 and the book authored by Mr. Farah, "Blood From 2 Stones"; is that correct, sir? 3 A That's correct. 4 Q And we have, in addition to that, we 5 have provided to you sections from the official 6 publication of the United States State Department 7 called Patterns of Terrorism? 8 A That's correct. 9 Q And I want to go through the information 10 that we've provided to you, specifically, sir. 11 Turning, first of all, to the report 12 that was filed in the Federal Court of Canada, in 13 relation to Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub – Mahjoub, 14 rather. Are there several references in that 15 report that are of significance to you in your 16 expert opinion regarding the issues of Sudan and 17 it's relationship to terrorist support? 18 A Yes, I remember a couple. You should 19 point me to the – 20 Q Yes, let's start with Page 15. 21 On Page 15, Paragraph 20, the AJ 22 terrorist, that is the Egyptian jihad, terrorist</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 17</p> <p>1 close, has been for many years, and certainly was 2 during the two years I was director of Central 3 Intelligence, so the document that they prepared 4 and authorized for disclosure I would have great 5 confidence in. 6 Q Now, on page, I believe it is 20 and 21, 7 there are some further references that I would like 8 to point to your attention concerning Sudan. 9 On Paragraph 28 – 10 MR. FARAH: 26. 11 MR. HALL: I'm sorry, let's go 12 earlier. 13 BY MR. HALL: 14 Q Paragraph 26: A 1998 agreement between 15 Al-Zaw – Al-Zawaheri and leaders of the Sudanese, 16 Eritrean, Ugandan, Yemeni, and the Egyptian Islamic 17 groups established budgets – budgets for financing 18 international terrorist operations and plans to 19 mobilize officials in Sudanese embassies in London, 20 Sanaa, New York, Rome, Karachi, and Mogadishu. 21 Is it significant, sir, that there would 22 be an agreement to use Sudanese embassies in 1998,</p>

5 (Pages 14 to 17)

R. James Woolsey

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 18</p> <p>1 in terms of being able to facilitate acts of 2 terrorists? 3 A Yes, I believe so. Because this is 4 after Bin Laden left his residency in Sudan and 5 moved to Afghanistan in '96, so I believe it is 6 significant that his number two, Al-Zawaheri and 7 leaders of Sudanese and other Islamic groups are 8 establishing budgets, and operations, and financing 9 operations and plans to mobilize officials in 10 Sudanese embassies in several countries. 11 Q I want to continue in the same 12 paragraph, sir, in the intelligence report provides 13 quote: These leaders also agreed at the meeting to 14 open Sudan's doors to international Islamic 15 fund-raising organizations and to facilitate the 16 movement of extremists, by providing them a 17 Sudanese diplomatic passports. 18 What is the relationship of that type of 19 support to an organization like al-Qaida in being 20 able to implement an attack on the Cole? 21 A Well, it's extremely important for an 22 international terrorist operation to be able to</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 20</p> <p>1 year were constructive and obtained some positive 2 results. By the end of the year Sudan had signed 3 all 12 international conventions for combating 4 terrorism and taken several other positive 5 counterterrorism steps, including closing down the 6 Popular Arab Islamic Conference which served as a 7 forum for terrorists. 8 Let me ask you, sir, prior to closing 9 this down in 2000, at the end of 2000, were you 10 familiar with the annual meeting of terrorists that 11 occurred in Sudan, at the Popular Arab and Islamic 12 Conference in -- 13 A Yes. This was taking place in -- under 14 this name or some other, in the -- at least one of 15 the years I was Director of Central Intelligence in 16 the early '90s. And, we used to call it sort of 17 the terrorist equivalent of the Paris Air Show. 18 It was really quite remarkable. Those 19 of us working in US intelligence thought that Sudan 20 would be this blatant in pulling all of these 21 terrorist organizations together in an annual 22 conference.</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 19</p> <p>1 have such things as even passports, but certainly 2 diplomatic passports, which would permit them to 3 move material without scrutiny in a number of 4 circumstances, and would, I think, be quite helpful 5 in helping them prepare to -- for any terrorist 6 attack. 7 Q Let me show you also, sir, the -- from 8 patterns of terrorism, which is the 2000 report, 9 and I am going to hand that to you and ask the 10 reporter to mark that as Exhibit 2. 11 MR. HALL: We will do the 12 marking after the deposition is over, so that we 13 don't interrupt the flow of the witness's 14 testimony. 15 BY MR. HALL: 16 Q On Page 35 of that report, which is an 17 official United States State Department 18 publication, there is a reference to Sudan, the 19 pertinent parts of which say, as follows: The 20 United States and Sudan in mid-2000 entered into a 21 dialogue to discuss US counterterrorism concerns. 22 The tasks, which were ongoing at the end of the</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 21</p> <p>1 Q Now even after closing down the 2 conference, this report continues: Sudan continued 3 to be used as a safe haven for members of the 4 various groups including associates of Osama Bin 5 Laden's al-Qaida organization, Egyptian Al-Gama's 6 al -- and I can't pronounce the term. 7 A Islamiyya. 8 Q Thank you. 9 Egyptian's Islamic Jihad, the Palestine 10 Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. Most of the groups used 11 Sudan primarily as a secure base for assisting 12 operations elsewhere. 13 So, sir, can you help me with that and 14 tell me what the significance of Sudan's allowing 15 itself to be used as a safe haven and safe base for 16 operations elsewhere? 17 A Well, I would say the significance of 18 this situation, as of the end of 2000, in this 19 April 2001 State Department document, is that Sudan 20 has made something of a transition to try to give a 21 less terrorist friendly impression to the rest of 22 the world, but still is permitting itself to be</p>

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<p style="text-align: right;">Page 22</p> <p>1 used as a safe haven by al-Qaida and other 2 terrorist organizations, so it has gone to some 3 extent from overt to slightly less overt assistance 4 to these terrorist groups. 5 Q And in terms of Sudan and Yemen, is 6 there a common border between these two countries? 7 A Well, there's the sea, right across 8 the -- right across the Gulf of Aden. It is very, 9 very close. 10 Q Right. And in terms of being able to 11 provide terrorists operating in Yemen, for example, 12 with regard to the attack on the Cole, is there a 13 path that runs from Sudan over? 14 A It's a very short trip by Dow across 15 that Gulf of Aden, I would -- I would think. 16 Q Yes, sir. Now, let me show you a -- 17 a -- quote a passage from Douglas Farah's book. He 18 fortunately is with us today, so -- and he has had 19 a chance to talk to you this morning; has he not? 20 A Yes. 21 Q And in that, the passage talks about the 22 movement of gold.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 24</p> <p>1 There was, then and still is to some 2 extent -- there was a civil war. There is now a -- 3 for the time being settled civil war, but 4 nonetheless, a great deal of hostility against the 5 Sudanese government in the south, in -- among 6 Christian and animist tribes that are not Muslim, 7 but these types of flights and this type of 8 trafficking would not find support or safe haven 9 among the followers of John Garang and the rebels 10 against the Khartoum government in the south and in 11 the rest of the country; where the government's 12 writ runs, this is not the sort of thing that would 13 be undertaken successfully without the government's 14 acquiescence. 15 Q And from all of this information, is it 16 your view that the government of Sudan is still, 17 although more covertly than in the mid-'90s, 18 involved in support -- providing support to 19 al-Qaida and safe haven to its operatives? 20 A As of this period of -- of time, of late 21 2000, I believe that the State Department report, 22 the Canadian Intelligence declassified report, and</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 23</p> <p>1 A Yes. 2 Q And specifically the passage starts on 3 Page 125. Let me hand that to you, sir. 4 A Mm-hmm. 5 Q And, this is again -- 6 A Yes, I read this just before the 7 deposition this morning. 8 Q -- and this is again, post the Osama Bin 9 Laden, this is as late as 2001 and 2002? 10 A This is, according to its text, in the 11 summer of 2002. 12 Q What is the significance -- can events 13 like that described in this section, that is to say 14 flying in plane loads of products with gold 15 intermixed in them, occur in Sudan without the 16 active knowledge and permission of the government? 17 A Assuming this is correct, and I have no 18 reason to believe otherwise, I think the answer to 19 the question is it's not reasonable to assume that 20 shipments of this sort would come without the 21 permission and acquiescence of the Sudanese 22 government.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 25</p> <p>1 unrefuted information, such as that included in 2 Douglas Farah's book, strongly suggest Sudanese 3 government acquiescence and continued acquiescence 4 and assistance to groups like al-Qaida and to 5 al-Qaida in particular. 6 There has been a good deal of 7 controversy about the question whether al-Qaida, a 8 Sunni Islamist organization, would work with Shiite 9 groups, such as the -- let's say the intelligence 10 services of the nation of Iran or with secular 11 government organizations, such as intelligence 12 organization for Baathist Iraq. 13 But, I think those connections have been 14 demonstrated to exist, and with respect to al-Qaida 15 connections with Sunni Islamist Sudan, there is no 16 ideological or religious tensions really that would 17 gainsay cooperation between Sudanese government and 18 the -- and al-Qaida, as of that time, so my 19 judgment, given the information I've seen here, and 20 given my understanding of the propensities of these 21 types of organizations in that part of the world, 22 I'd say it's quite likely that there was</p>

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<p style="text-align: right;">Page 26</p> <p>1 cooperation between Sudanese government 2 principally, probably through its intelligence 3 services and al-Qaida, as of late 2000. 4 Q Now, in terms of -- we've talked about 5 things like the actual presence of a training camp. 6 I believe that was in the -- one of the documents 7 from the Canadian report on Page 15. I think we 8 found that earlier. 9 A Yes, I think that's right. It says as 10 of the time of the Canadian document, which is, as 11 I understand it, early 2001, pre-9/11, in Sudan and 12 Bosnia, AJ, Al-Jihad camps are financed by Saudi 13 dissident and terrorist financier Osama Bin Laden. 14 Q And, they're--they're in Sudan, these 15 camps? 16 A Yeah, that's what it says, in Sudan. 17 Q And of course we made you aware of the 18 fact that Osama Bin Laden has several active 19 businesses that are generating funds that are used 20 by Osama Bin Laden for his al-Qaida efforts in 21 Sudan at this time? 22 A Well, I recall from press reports</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 28</p> <p>1 A -- is a question. 2 Q Assume -- 3 A Read it -- read it. 4 Q Let me go through -- 5 A All right. 6 Q -- I will put it in front of you -- 7 A All right. 8 Q -- so we can go through it together. 9 A All right. 10 Q Has providing economic support provided 11 training camps and a basis for training of 12 terrorists, false documents for members of 13 al-Qaida, including identities on passports, and 14 assistance through the embassies of Sudan, has 15 that -- have those support measures assisted 16 al-Qaida in its success in performing jihads 17 through attacks against American interests 18 throughout the world, in particular the Cole? 19 A Based on the Canadian report we have 20 here, the State Department reports, and the Douglas 21 Farah material, which as far as I know is 22 unrefuted, I would say yes, that's a fair judgment.</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 27</p> <p>1 that -- and I've seen it here this morning, that 2 even after he left his residence in Sudan in '96 to 3 move to Afghanistan, he had business interests, the 4 one I recall is construction. That was a business 5 his father was in in Sudan. 6 Q Right. Now, let me just see if I can 7 wrap it up very quickly, because you have been kind 8 enough to give us this hour, and I don't want to 9 overstay the time or actually it's a half-hour but 10 I wanted -- I promised you I would get done with 11 you as quickly as we -- as time permitted, so last 12 area, sir. 13 Has providing economic support a basis 14 for training terrorism -- terrorists, false 15 documentation, including passports for members of 16 al-Qaida, assistance through the embassies of 17 Sudan, assisted al-Qaida in its success in 18 performing its jihads and its attacks against 19 American interests throughout the world, and 20 particularly attack of the Cole? 21 A And that is, what you just read -- 22 Q Is my question.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 29</p> <p>1 Q And would it be as easy for al-Qaida to 2 have launched the attack on the Cole without the 3 support of Sudan? 4 A It would not have been as easy. It 5 might have been possible, but it would not have 6 been as easy. The proximity of Sudan to -- to 7 Yemen, the need for a protected logistics 8 infrastructure, the confused situation in the 9 government of Yemen at the time all suggest to me 10 that the amount of explosives that needed to be put 11 in the boat that attacked the Cole, all that 12 suggests to me that the logistical support and base 13 of operations that could have been available in 14 Sudan could have been of substantial assistance to 15 an attack in Yemen, such as one that occurred. 16 Q It's your opinion that that is a -- is a 17 more likely than not source of those materials? 18 A I believe that to be the case. More 19 likely than not is a fair way to put it. 20 MR. HALL: Thank you. That's 21 all I have. 22 VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is</p>

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<p style="text-align: right;">Page 30</p> <p>1 10:03. We are going off the record. This is the 2 end of tape number one and the end of today's 3 deposition. 4 (Woolsey Exhibit No. 2 - Patterns of Global 5 Terrorism 2000, US State Department, April 6 2001 - was marked for identification.) 7 (Thereupon, at 10:05 a.m. the deposition was 8 concluded.) 9 (The witness reserved signature.) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 32</p> <p>1 CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC 2 I, Joanne Liverani, the officer before whom the 3 foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that 4 the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing 5 deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of 6 said witness was taken by me in stenotype and thereafter 7 reduced to typewriting under my direction; that said 8 deposition is a true record of the testimony given by 9 said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, 10 nor employed by any of the parties to the action in 11 which this deposition was taken; and, further, that I am 12 not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel 13 employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or 14 otherwise interested in the outcome of this action. 15 16 17 Joanne Liverani, 18 Registered Merit Reporter 19 and Notary Public for the 20 District of Columbia 21 My Commission expires: 22 19 July 31, 2005</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 31</p> <p>1 2 3 * * * 4 5 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEPONENT 6 7 I, R. James Woolsey, do hereby acknowledge I have 8 read and examined the foregoing pages of testimony, and 9 the same is a true, correct and complete transcription 10 of the testimony given by me, and any changes and/or 11 corrections, if any, appear in the attached errata sheet 12 signed by me. 13 14 15 Date <u> </u> R. James Woolsey 16 17 18 19 20 21 22</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 33</p> <p>1 Andrew Hall, Esq. 2 Hall David & Joseph 3 1428 Brickell Avenue 4 Miami, Florida 33131-9133 5 IN RE: RUX V. SUDAN 6 DEPO OF: R. JAMES WOOLSEY 7 8 Dear Mr. Hall: 9 10 Enclosed for review is your original and copy of the 11 above referenced deposition. Please have the deponent 12 read the transcript and sign the enclosed certificate of 13 deponent. Also enclosed is an errata sheet which the 14 deponent should use to note corrections and the reasons 15 for such corrections. This and any additional errata 16 sheets should be signed and dated by the deponent. 17 18 The deponent has thirty days in which to read and sign 19 the transcript. After the deponent has reviewed the 20 copy of the transcript, please return the certificate of 21 deponent and any errata sheets to 1020 19th Street, 22 Northwest, Suite 620, Washington, D.C. 20036. 23 24 Sincerely, 25 26 Joanne Liverani</p>

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Lorenzo Vidino, Ph.D./J.D.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Center for Security Studies Swiss Federal Polytechnic/ETH (Zurich, Switzerland) <i>Senior Fellow</i>	June 2011
RAND Corporation (Arlington, VA) <i>Visiting Fellow</i>	October 2010-June 2011
Harvard University Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government (Cambridge, MA) <i>Fellow in International Security/Religion in International Affairs</i>	August 2009-June 2010
United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC) <i>Peace Scholar</i>	August 2009-June 2010
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, MA) <i>Fellow in International Security Studies</i>	August 2007- June 2009
Jebsen Center for Counterterrorism Studies Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, MA) <i>Research Programs Manager</i>	May 2006-May 2007
The Investigative Project on Terrorism (Washington, DC) <i>Terrorism Analyst/Deputy Director/Consultant</i>	June 2002-August 2007

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Universität Zürich (Zurich, Switzerland) <i>"Issues in Contemporary Terrorism and Radicalization"</i>	Fall Semester 2011
National Defense University (Washington, DC) <i>"Political Islam"</i>	Spring Semester 2011
University of Maryland/START (College Park, MD) <i>"Political Islam in the West"</i>	Winter Semester 2011
Tufts University (Medford, MA) <i>"Al Qaeda and modern terrorism"</i>	Spring Semester 2009



EDUCATION

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, MA) March 2010
Ph.D., International Relations.

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, MA) April 2007
Masters of Arts in Law and Diplomacy, International Security Studies
and Islamic Civilization.

Università degli Studi di Milano Law School (Milan, Italy) June 2002
Dottore in Giurisprudenza (Juris Doctor). Focus on international law.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH INTERESTS

- Terrorism and counter-terrorism, radicalization and counter-radicalization.
- Political Islam, particularly its developments in Europe and North America.
- Security studies (insurgency and counterinsurgency, armed non-state actors), European and American foreign policy, transatlantic relations, international organized crime, immigration, social movement theory.

ACTIVITIES

- Regularly briefs/consults for agencies and ministries in the United States (Office of the Vice-President, FBI, CIA, NCTC, NSA, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security...) and several European countries on issues of terrorism and political Islam.
- Testified three times before the U.S. Congress.
- Regularly interviewed as a terrorism expert on several American and international media outlets, including *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Times of London*, *El Pais*, *Der Spiegel*, *Corriere della Sera*...
- Regularly appears on American (NBC, PBS, CBS, CNN, FOX News, CNBC, MSNBC...), Middle Eastern (Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera International, Al Hayat LBC...), and European (BBC, France 24, SRF, DR, RAI...) TV programs. Regularly interviewed by international and local radio stations, including NPR, Voice of America, BBC Radio...
- Frequent reviewer for International Security, Terrorism and Political Violence, Columbia University Press, Smith Richardson Foundation, Hurst...
- Testified as an expert witness in court cases in the United States and France.
- Consults on a regular basis with private businesses, law firms, and think tanks on issues of terrorism and political Islam.
- Traveled to more than 30 countries in 4 continents (many of them several times) for research. Spent at least 10 weeks every year traveling for research purposes over the last ten years.

GRANTS

- **Public Safety Canada—Kanishka Project:** grant to study the use of the internet by convicted militants (project leader, conducted together with experts from Canada and the United States). March 2013.
- **Spanish Ministry for Science and Defense (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación):** grant to study the organizational structure of international terrorism and its impact on European security (together with a group of Spanish academics). June 2011.
- **U.S. Department of Defense:** grant to study counter-radicalization programs in four European countries (project leader, together with James Brandon). June 2011.
- **Fritz Thyssen Stiftung:** individual grant to conduct two-year study of counter-radicalization efforts in Europe and North America.
- **U.S. Institute of Peace:** Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellowship (Jennings Randolph Fellowship), 2009/10.
- **Smith Richardson Foundation:** individual grant to conduct a two-year study of Muslim community engagement efforts by Western governments, 2008/09.
- **Ph.D. Fellowship,** Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2008.
- **Earhart Fellowship,** Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2007.
- **Jebsen Center,** Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, summer research grant, 2006.

NON RESIDENT AFFILIATIONS

- International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College London
- Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia
- European Foundation for Democracy, Brussels
- Italian Institute of Strategic Studies Niccolò Machiavelli, Rome

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

- Italian and English (native/near native)
- Spanish (conversational)
- German and French (basic knowledge)

PUBLICATIONS

Books

- *Western Governments and Political Islam after 2011*, Al Mesbar Studies and Research Center (Dubai, December 2012). Editor. In Arabic.
 - Translated and published in English as an EBook by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2013 (titled *The West And The Muslim Brotherhood After The Arab Spring*).
- *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, Columbia University Press, August 2010 (336 pages).
 - Translated and published in Arabic by Al Mesbar Studies and Research Center, Dubai (2011).
- *Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad*, Prometheus, 2005 (403 pages).
 - Translated and published in Danish by Gyldendal (2006).

Book chapters

- "From KSM's Genius to Sheer Amateurism: The Post-9/11 Evolution of the Terrorist Threat in the United States," in Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, eds., *Leader-Led Jihad, Rethinking the Global Terrorism Threat* (Columbia University Press, 2013), [forthcoming]
- "The European organization of the Muslim Brotherhood: Myth or Reality?" in Edwin Bakker and Roel Meijer, eds., *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe* (Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2012).
- "Counter-radicalisation in the United States," in Rik Coolsaet, ed., *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge. European and American Experiences* (Ashgate, 2011).
- "The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization: The European Debate," in Laurie Fenstermacher and Todd Leventhal, eds., *Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies* (U.S. Department of Defense, September 2011)
- Two entries ("John Walker Lindh" and "Jose Padilla") in Gus Martin, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, 2nd Edition (Sage, 2011).
- "Homegrown jihadist terrorism in the United States: A new and occasional phenomenon?" in John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, eds., *Terrorism Studies: A Reader* (Routledge, 2011).
- "Islamist Terrorism: Assessing Threats to Democracy," in Christopher K. Penny, ed., *The Administration of Justice and National Security in Democracies* (Irwin Law and the Federal Court of Canada, Ottawa, 2011)
- "Counter-radicalization and Europe's New Security Dilemma," in Eric Patterson and John Gallagher, eds., *Debating the War of Ideas* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).
- "The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe," in Barry Rubin, ed., *Muslim Brotherhoods: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).

- “The rising tide of Islamic radicalism,” in Marvin Perry and Howard E. Negrin, eds., *The theory and practice of Islamic terrorism: an anthology* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).
- “Origins and characteristics of homegrown jihadist networks in Europe” in Franz Eder and Martin Senn, eds., *Europe and Transnational Terrorism: Assessing Threats and Countermeasures* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008).
- “Den Nye Terrorisme” (“New Terrorism”) in Jakob Aahauge and Pelle Schierup, eds., *Terrorensanatomi* (Rosenkilde, 2007, in Danish).

Journal articles

- “The Italian Radical Left’s Ambivalent Fascination with Terrorism,” *Dynamics Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Towards Terrorism and Genocide*, DOI:10.1080/17467586.2012.745195, 2012.
- “Europe’s Experience in Countering Radicalisation: Approaches and Challenges,” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 7:2 (2012), 163-179 (with James Brandon)
- “Jihadism in Europe,” *German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East (Zeitschrift ORIENT)*, IV, 2011.
- “The Buccinasco pentiti: a unique case study of radicalization,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23: 3, 398 — 418, 2011.
- “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict,” *African Security*, 3:216–238, 2010 (with Evan Kohlmann and Raffaello Pantucci).
- “London’s frantic quest for the Muslim holy grail: the post-9/11 evolution of the relationship between Whitehall and the British Muslim community,” *Religion Compass*, Volume 5, Issue 4, April 2011.
- “Europe’s New Security Dilemma,” *Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (October 2009): 61-75.
- “Islamism and the West: Europe as a Battlefield,” *Islamism, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* (Routledge/ Taylor & Francis), 10:1 (2009).
- “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 32, Issue 1, (January 2009).
- “Islam, political Islam and Jihadism in Italy,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, August 2008.
- “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume 30, Issue 7, (July 2007).
- “After the Danish Cartoon Controversy,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2007 (with Pernille Ammitzbøll).
- “The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan,” *Al Nakhla*, Fall 2006.
- “Aims and Methods of Europe’s Muslim Brotherhood,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, November 2006.
- “Arab Foreign Fighters and the Sacralization of the Chechen Conflict,” *Al Nakhla*, Spring 2006.

- “Jihad from Europe,” *Journal of International Security Affairs*, Fall 2005.
- “How Chechnya Became a Breeding Ground for Terror,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2005.
- “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2005.

Other publications

- The Sentinel (West Point Combating Terrorism Center), *The evolution of jihadism in Italy: Rise in homegrown radicals*, November 2012.
- Longitude (official monthly of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *O Brotherhood: Where Art Thou?* August 2013. Cover story.
- Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (official journal of the German Federal Agency for Civic Education), *Deradikalisierung durch gezielte Interventionen*, 29-31, July 2013.
- Vice Magazine, *A Long Way from Home*, May 2013 issue.
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- The Sentinel (West Point Combating Terrorism Center), *European Experiences in Counterradicalization*, June 2012. With James Brandon.
- ISN Insight (ETH Zurich), *Assessing the Toulouse Killings*, March 29, 2012.
- ISN Insight (ETH Zurich), *Facing the New Islamist Challenge*, May 31, 2011.
- The Sentinel (West Point Combating Terrorism Center), *The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Europe*, December 2010.
- Panorama (leading Italian weekly), *Così Finanziario la Striscia*, Issue 6, January 30, 2009.
- Panorama (leading Italian weekly), *Jihadisti Pentiti a Scuola di Non Violenza*, Issue 48, November 21, 2008.
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- Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, *The Multi-layered Threat of Islamism to Europe*, Summer Issue, Volume 14, 2008.
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- Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, *Is Italy Next in Line After London?* September 2005.
- Armed Forces Journal, *The Enemy Within*, January 2005.

Op-eds

- *Hisba in Europe? Assessing a Murky Phenomenon*, European Foundation for Democracy, June 2013.
- *The Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring: Tactics, Challenges and Future Scenarios*, Center for European Studies, May 2013.
- *European Strategies against Jihadist Radicalisation*, CSS Analysis, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Issue 128, February 2013.
- *Countering Radicalization in Europe*, International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, King's College London, December 2012.
- *Lessons Learnt: Post-Mubarak developments within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood*, U.K. Arts and Humanities Research Council, Swindon, December 2011.
- *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Hurdles on the Way to Power*, Strategic Trends Analysis, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, N. 101, October 2011.
- *Radicalization, Linkage and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe*, Occasional Paper, RAND Corporation, July 2011.
- *The Impact of the Arab Awakening on Muslim Radicalization in Europe: A Preliminary Assessment*, special report for the Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, Spain, ARI 120/2011, July 14, 2011.
- *Political Islam in Europe*, report for the Centre for European Studies, Brussels, June 2011.
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- *The Global Muslim Brotherhood: Myth or Reality?*, report for the Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, Issue Brief 10, March 2, 2011.
- *Egyptian Crosscurrents: The Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy on the Nile*, report for the Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, Issue Brief 9, March 2, 2011.
- *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe*, special report for the U.S. Institute of Peace, November 2010.
- *The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland*, special report for the Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, Spain, ARI 171/2009, December 18, 2009.

PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS

- Bundesverfassungsschutz (German domestic intelligence agency), conference on de-radicalization, *Targeted interventions: the experience of three European countries*, Berlin, November 27, 2013.
- Foro Elcano on Global Terrorism, *La amenaza del terrorismo yihadista en Italia* (The threat of jihadist terrorism in Italy), Casa Arabe, Madrid, November 14, 2013. In Spanish.

- European Foundation for Democracy, *Media Reporting on From Radicalisation to foreign fighters: How can the US and the EU learn from each other?* moderator, European Parliament, Brussels, September 25, 2013.
- Mossos d'Esquadra academy, launch of the report *Hisba in Europe: Assessing a Murky Phenomenon*, Mollet del Valles (Catalan police headquarters), July 18, 2013. In Spanish and Catalan.
- United States Consulate, Barcelona, launch of the report *Hisba in Europe: Assessing a Murky Phenomenon*, Barcelona, July 15, 2013. In English and Catalan.
- Virginia Tech and Applied Research Corporation, conference on countering violent extremism, *Counter-radicalization in Europe*, July 12, 2013. Via videoconference.
- Universidad Pablo de Olavide (Sevilla), summer course for Spanish military and intelligence community, *Hisba in Western Europe*, Carmona (Sevilla, Spain), July 9, 2013. In Spanish.
- European Parliament, launch of the report *Hisba in Europe: Assessing a Murky Phenomenon*, Brussels, June 25, 2013.
- ISPI, panel on New Terrorism: Beyond al Qaeda, *The Jihadist Threat in Europe*, Milan, June 18, 2013. In Italian.
- Center for European Studies, launch of the report *The Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring: Tactics, Challenges and Future Scenarios*, Brussels, May 29, 2013.
- European Foundation for Democracy, *Radicalisation and the Internet*, moderator, European Parliament, Brussels, May 28, 2013.
- ISN, *Public Policy and (Myths About) Terrorism*, discussant, Zurich, May 22, 2013.
- Turkish National Police Academy, *Countering Radicalization in Europe*, Ankara, May 7, 2013.
- Indonesian Embassy and FORAS, panel *Political Islam - from North Africa to South East Asia*, Zurich, April 25, 2013.
- Royal Danish Defence College, Security Policy Course on the Middle East, North and East Africa 2013, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamism after the Arab spring*, Copenhagen, April 11, 2013.
- Roskilde University, panel discussion, *Islamism and Secularism after the Arab Uprisings*, Roskilde (Denmark), April 11, 2013.
- Foreign Policy Research Institute, book launch, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West*, Washington, DC, March 20, 2013.
- George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Program on Terrorism and Security Studies, *Disengagement and de-Radicalization*, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, March 13, 2012.
- United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and University of Turin, Masters of Law in International Crime and Justice, two-day lecture on radicalization and counter-radicalization, Turin, March 7 and 8, 2013.

- European Foundation for Democracy, *Media Reporting on Radicalisation: Striking the Right Balance*, moderator, European Parliament, Brussels, January 23, 2013.
- Fundación Ortega-Marañón and Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 10th Permanent Seminar on Terrorism: *Contrarrestando la radicalización yihadista en Europa* (Countering Jihadist Radicalization in Europe), November 14, 2013.
- European Foundation for Democracy, *Radicalisation in Schools and Universities: Heeding the Warning Signs*, moderator, European Parliament, Brussels, November 13, 2012.
- European Foundation for Democracy, *Junge Muslime in Gefahr? Salafismus in Deutschland (Young Muslims in Danger? Salafism in Germany)*, introductory speech, Bonn, November 3, 2012.
- Mossos d'Esquadra academy, conference on "Intelligence Facing Radicalization," *The Importance of Prevention Policies*, Mollet del Valles (Catalan police headquarters), October 30, 2012.
- George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Senior Executive Seminar, *Pathways out of Violent Extremism*, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, September 11, 2012.
- Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Spring of Religions? The different faces of the Muslim Brotherhood*, Rome, June 26, 2012.
- Center for Near Abroad Strategic Studies, *The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Egyptian Presidential Elections*, Rome, June 25, 2012.
- George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Program on Terrorism and Security Studies, *Counter-Radicalization in Europe*, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, June 19, 2012.
- Link Campus University/Centro Studi Germani, Seminar on Fundamentalisms in the World, *The Muslim Brotherhood between Fundamentalism and Pragmatism*, Rome, May 15, 2012.
- Global Counter Terrorism Conference, Counter Terror Expo 2012, *Islamism and Political Violence: The Effects on Europe's Security*, London, April 25, 2012.
- Brussels Forum (German Marshall Fund of the United States' annual conference), *The Rise of Political Islam*, Brussels, March 24, 2012.
- Centre for European Studies and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, conference titled The West and the New Middle East, *The rise of Islamism: Implications for the West*, Brussels, March 22, 2012.
- Canadian Security Intelligence Service's headquarters, luncheon lecture, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, Ottawa, March 20, 2012.
- King's College London, *Countering radicalization in Europe*, March 14, 2012.
- George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, *Islamism and Jihadism in Italy*, Italian Parliament, Rome, March 6, 2012.
- ETH Zurich, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Lessons Learned from Indonesia, conversation between Amien Rais and Lorenzo Vidino*, Zurich, February 29, 2012.
- Fundación Ortega-Marañón and Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 10th Permanent Seminar on Terrorism: *Terrorist Radicalization and Delegation of Jihadist Terrorism in the United States and Western Europe*, November 14, 2011.

- Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations (Egmont), Terrorism, Radicalisation & De-Radicalisation: European and American Experiences Conference, Brussels: *Counter-Radicalisation in the U.S.*, October 10, 2011.
- International Institute for Counter Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel, *The Radicalization Process in the West and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization* (moderator), September 13, 2011.
- International Centre for Counterterrorism, The Hague, *De-Radicalization Programs in Europe*, The Hague, August 23, 2011.
- Global Futures Forum, joint conference organized by the governments of Spain (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia) and the United States (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of State), *The Impact of Identity Politics on Violent Extremism*, Madrid, Spain, June 22, 2011.
- International Security Forum 2011, Zurich, Switzerland, *Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Terrorism Begins and Ends*, May 31, 2011.
- United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), Lucca, Italy, *Upstream prevention and downstream disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration*, (moderator of the Asia panel), May 25, 2011.
- Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the USA: Social Service or Taqiyya?* Annual Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs, May 19, 2011.
- RAND Corporation, Arlington VA, *Political Islam in Europe*, May 13, 2011.
- National Press Club, Washington DC, *The Global Muslim Brotherhood: Myth or Reality?* April 27, 2011.
- American Jewish Committee, Washington DC, *The Global Muslim Brotherhood*. April 27, 2011.
- Council of Foreign Relations, New York, roundtable with Ed Husain, *Global Prospects for the Muslim Brotherhood*, April 25, 2011.
- House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis and Counterintelligence: *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West: Characteristics, Aims and Policy Considerations*. April 13, 2011.
- Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington DC, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, March 21, 2011.
- Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, *Book Discussion: The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, March 17, 2011.
- U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Anti-Terrorism Caucus, Washington DC: *Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism 101*, March 4, 2011.
- United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC: *Countering Radicalization in America*, December 15, 2010.
- RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA: *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, December 14, 2010.
- RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA: *The De-Radicalization of Islamist Extremist*, November 30, 2010.
- Foreign Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC: *The Foreign Fighter Problem: Recent Trends and Case Studies*, September 27, 2010.

- International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (King's College), annual conference, New York: *Radicalisation in the West*, July 1, 2010.
- Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University: *Firefighters or Arsonists? Debating the Role of Non-violent Islamists in Counter-radicalization Programs*, May 6, 2010.
- Italian Ministry of Defense (Istituto Alti Studi per la Difesa, IASD) and George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Rome: *The Ideological Dimension of Counterterrorism*, April 15, 2010.
- Counter-Terror Expo 2010, London: *Radicalisation - A New Security Dilemma for Europe?* April 14, 2010.
- Harvard Institute for Learning in Retirement, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: *De-radicalizing Homegrown Terrorists: Lessons from the Middle East and Europe*, April 2, 2010.
- Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Cambridge, MA: *Islamic Radicalization in the U.S. Homeland: A Myth or Reality?*, March 31, 2010.
- Islam in the West Workshop, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe*, March 23, 2010.
- Politische Akademie der ÖVP/Centre for European Studies, Vienna (Austria): *Understanding Political Islam*, March 22, 2010.
- Link Campus University, Department of Strategic Intelligence and Security, Rome (Italy), three-hour course: *Europe's New Security Dilemma*, December 19, 2009.
- Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" and General Intelligence and Security Service of the Dutch Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations (AIVD), seminar on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, The Hague, *The European Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood: Myth or Reality?* December 4, 2009.
- George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Skopje (Macedonia): *Countering the Ideological Support for Terrorism*, November 23, 2009.
- Fundación José Ortega y Gasset, Madrid (Spain), *Terrorist Threats on Both Sides of the Atlantic: Differences and Similarities*, November 16, 2009.
- Legatum Institute, London: *Terrorism in the United States*, November 6, 2009.
- British Association of Chief Police Officers, UK Office of Security and Counter Terrorism, Home Office, Wilton Park (UK), *Islamism and Shared Values*, November 4-6, 2009.
- U.S. Consulate, Barcelona (Spain), roundtable: *Counter-Radicalization Efforts in Europe and Europe's New Security Dilemma*, October 23, 2009.
- Universidad de Granada (Spain), conference on European security: *Counter-radicalization efforts in Europe*, October 22, 2009.
- Universidad Carlos III, Madrid (Spain): *Europe's New Security Dilemma*, October 20, 2009.
- Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid (Spain): lecture entitled *Countering violent Islamist radicalization: a preliminary assessment of the European experience*, October 20, 2009.

- International Security Studies Section of ISA/International Security and Arms Control Section of APSA Annual Conference, *Monterey Institute of International Studies and Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: The Hofstadgroep as a New Model of Terrorism in the West*, October 16, 2009.
- Peace Scholars conference, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., *Soft Approaches to Counterterrorism: Counter-radicalization in Great Britain and the Netherlands*, October 5, 2006.
- Boston ROTC Consortium, Boston, MA: *Current Trends in Terrorism*, March 25, 2009.
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, National Anti-Terrorism Conference, Boston, MA: *The Muslim Brotherhood: History, Methods, Aims and Security Implications*, March 20, 2009.
- King's College, London, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence: *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe*, December 9, 2008.
- Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2008 Fletcher Doctoral Conference: *Armed Groups: A Major 21st Century Security Challenge*, October 17, 2008.
- U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and University of Texas, Austin, TX: *The Current Terrorist Enemies of the United States: Prospects for a New U.S. Administration*, September 17/18, 2008.
- Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Istanbul, Turkey: *Links Between Crime and Terrorism*, June 28, 2008.
- Joint Special Operations University (SOCOM), Shirlington, VA: *Terrorist Networks and Beyond al-Qaeda*, June 17, 2008.
- 16-hour course at the Tufts University's Osher Lifelong Learning Institute: *Terrorism, Political Islam and U.S. Policies*, March to May 2008.
- Newton Public Schools Lifelong Learning, Newton, MA: *The "War on Terror": Reasons and Goals*, October 24, 2007.
- International Institute for Counter Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel: *Homegrown Terrorism in Europe and the US*, September 11, 2007.
- NEFA Foundation, Florence, Italy: *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, June 13, 2007.
- Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (in association with the Canadian Supreme Court), Ottawa, Canada: *International Terrorism: Assessing Threats to Democracy and Law*, June 11, 2007.
- Global Investigative Journalist Conference, Toronto, Canada: *Investigating Terrorist Organizations*, May 25, 2007.
- Osher Lifelong Learning Institute, Medford, MA: *The "War on Terror": Reasons and Goals*, April 23, 2007.
- Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington DC: *Jihad in Europe*, April 16, 2007.
- Jebson Center for Counterterrorism Studies, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University: *Al Qaeda in the West*, March 7, 2007.
- Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Belfer Center: *Terrorism, a European Perspective*, March 2, 2007.

- CENTRA (organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agencies), Arlington VA: *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, November 6, 2006.
- Italian Senate, Rome, *The withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq: and then?* (in Italian), June 28, 2006.
- CENTRA (organized by U.S. State Department), London: *Muslim Radicalization in Europe*, July 26, 2006.
- INTERPOL, Lyon, Complex Asian Crime Symposium: *The Links Between Organized Crime and Terrorism*, June 27, 2006.
- Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen: *Jihad in Europe*, June 9, 2006.
- Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, Forum with Francis Fukuyama and Daniel Benjamin: *Islamic Fundamentalism in Europe: Transatlantic Perspectives*, May 18, 2006.
- Osher Lifelong Learning Institute, Medford, MA: *Al Qaeda*, April 28, 2006.
- Simmons College, Boston, MA, lecture on terrorism in Europe, March 6, 2006.
- Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, EPHC Symposium: *Identity Crisis: Europe, Immigration and "the Other"*, February 25, 2006.
- University of Malta, Rome: *Islamic Radicalism in Europe*, January 10, 2006. In Italian.